

Gewaltfreie Zivilverteidigung (CF-I)

Einleitung CF:

Infos zu zivil-gewaltfreie Konfliktlösung, bezogen besonders auf den Ukraine-Russland-Konflikt, bekam ich vor eineinhalb Jahren von einem Vertreter von Pax Christi. Ich fand es hochinteressant und denke, das sollte eigentlich viel bekannter sein. Ich habe versucht, die Informationen aus meiner Sicht zusammenzufassen (siehe unten).

Vielleicht ist euch das meiste bekannt? Wie auch immer, ihr könnt das natürlich gerne weiterleiten, wenn ihr meint, es könnte Leute aus euren Kreisen interessieren. Neulich bin ich außerdem auf den Philosophen Olaf Müller gestoßen, der einen "pragmatischen Pazifismus" vertritt. Seine Überlegungen finde ich auch bemerkenswert. Bei Interesse kann ich euch dazu gerne auch was zuschicken.

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Mein Fazit aus den angehängten bzw. unten zitierten Quellen:

- Es gibt mehr Beispiele (teils erfolgreicher) Versuche gewaltfreier Konfliktlösungen als viele denken:
 - mindestens zunächst und/oder teilweise erfolgreich (nach meiner Kenntnis oder Aussage der Quellen, wäre z.T. noch zu überprüfen):
USA: Bürgerrechtsbewegung der Schwarzen, Warschauer Pakt (um 1989, inkl. DDR; Polen schon früher?), Südafrika, Ägypten, Iran (Sturz des Schahs), Chile (Sturz Pinochets), Dänemark (Nazizeit), Palästina, Serbien (2000), Madagaskar (2002), Ukraine (2004), Libanon (2005), Indien, Nepal (2006), Malediven, Thailand, Pakistan, Venezuela, Argentinien, Brasilien, Bangladesch, Ghana, Estland, Ungarn (gegen Habsburg), u.a.
 - nicht erfolgreich: Tschechoslowakei, China (auf mehr bin ich nicht gestoßen, aber es gibt ja bestimmt viele andere)
- Nach den u.g. Quellen
 - war gewaltfreier Widerstand in der jüngeren Geschichte wohl häufiger erfolgreich als bewaffneter. (Die Aussage ist nicht, dass die Ergebnisse gewaltfreier Aktionen immer befriedigend waren, aber das gilt für die bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen eben mindestens im gleichen Maße.)
 - waren die Reaktionen auf gewaltfreies Handeln zwar oft brutal, im Durchschnitt waren die Verluste an Menschenleben und sonstigen Zerstörungen aber viel geringer
 - begünstigen gewaltfreie Aufstände eher eine demokratische Entwicklung als bewaffnete, trotz deprimierender Gegenbeispiele (Iran nach dem Sturz des Schahs u.a.)
 - gab es - teils erfolgreiche - gewaltfreie Aktionen in den verschiedensten Kulturen und auch gegen brutale Diktaturen.
- Ukraine - Russland - Konflikt
Dazu ein Zitat aus Bartkowski (2021, s.u.; siehe auch die dortigen Grafiken):
"Die Ukrainer (zeigten 2021) ein überraschendes Maß an Unterstützung für die Art von Widerstand, die weder die ukrainischen Politiker noch ihre westlichen Unterstützer in ihrer Verteidigungsplanung

in Betracht gezogen haben: gewaltlose Massenwiderstandsaktionen gegen einen gewaltigen militärischen Angreifer. Dieses menschliche Potenzial für gewaltlosen Widerstand bleibt in der nationalen Verteidigungsstrategie der Ukraine leider ungenutzt".

Hier noch **weitere Zitate** aus diesen Quellen, die einiges zusammenfassen bzw. die ich besonders aussagekräftig fand.

(Ich habe die Texte nicht vollständig gelesen, zumal englisch, aber versucht das Wesentliche zu erfassen.)

Bartkowski (2021)

historisch-global:

(Die Ergebnisse der vorgelegten Untersuchung) "stimmen interessanterweise eng mit der historischen Bilanz des Kampfes gegen Besatzer überein. Die Daten zeigen, dass zwischen 1900 und 2006 gewaltlose Kämpfe gegen Besatzer in 35 % der Fälle erfolgreich waren, während bewaffneter Widerstand in 36 % der Fälle erfolgreich war (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011). Keine der beiden Widerstandsarten war häufiger erfolgreich als sie scheiterte, aber erfolgreicher und gescheiterter bewaffneter Widerstand dauerte im Durchschnitt dreimal so lange wie seine gewaltlosen Pendanten, war immer mit enormen menschlichen und infrastrukturellen Kosten für die lokale Bevölkerung verbunden (z. B. Vietnam 1960er Jahre), hatte eine viel geringere Wahrscheinlichkeit, danach eine Demokratie aufzubauen (Algerien 1962) und zerstörte oder traumatisierte die Zivilgesellschaft (z. B. Ungarn 1956), deren Stärke und Mobilisierung für den Aufbau von Demokratie und deren Nachhaltigkeit erforderlich sind. Im Gegensatz dazu kann gewaltloser Widerstand historisch gesehen viel schneller zum Erfolg führen als der bewaffnete Kampf (Nepal 2004); selbst bei einem Scheitern des gewaltlosen Widerstands bleibt die Struktur der Zivilgesellschaft effektiver erhalten, so dass der Kampf an einem anderen Tag wieder aufgenommen werden kann (Tschechoslowakei 1968), und die Chancen für den Aufbau einer Demokratie sind viel höher als bei erfolgreichem bewaffnetem Widerstand (Polen 1980er Jahre gegenüber Afghanistan 1980er und 2000er Jahre)."

Daza (2022)

Aus der Einführung:

"Dieser Bericht untersucht den ukrainischen gewaltfreien zivilen Widerstand gegen die russische Invasion vom 24. Februar bis zum 30. Juni 2022 mit dem Ziel, seine organisatorische Dynamik, seine Auswirkungen im Kontext des Krieges und Unterstützungsmöglichkeiten zur Stärkung der beteiligten gesellschaftlichen Akteure zu ermitteln. Diese Studie richtet sich daher nicht nur an Akteure, die die Konflikttransformation in der Ukraine und der Region unterstützen wollen, sondern an alle Organisationen und Einzelpersonen, die sich mit gewaltfreien Aktionen und Konflikttransformation beschäftigen oder daran interessiert sind. Die ukrainische Erfahrung ist sicherlich einzigartig, und wir können aus ihr neue Wege der zivilen Intervention in globalen Krisen ohne den Einsatz von Waffen lernen."

Zu einer bestimmten historisch-globalen Untersuchung (s.u.):

"Die Studie 'Why Civil Resistance Works' von Erika Chenoweth und Maria Stephan, die auf einer

Analyse von 323 gewalttätigen und gewaltfreien Kampagnen zwischen 1900 und 2006 basiert, kommt zu dem Schluss, dass gewaltfreie Kampagnen ihre Ziele effektiver * erreichen als gewalttätige Aktionen und dass sie effektiver zur Entwicklung dauerhafter, friedlicher Demokratien beitragen (2011). Eines der Schlüsselemente für diesen Erfolg ist die Fähigkeit, breite und vielfältige Bevölkerungsgruppen auf dezentralisierte Weise zu mobilisieren. Die breite Beteiligung der Gesellschaft ist Ausdruck der Macht des Volkes und verleiht den von gewaltfreien Bewegungen angestrebten Prozessen des sozialen Wandels Legitimität und Nachhaltigkeit."

Chenoweth & Stephan (2012) **

Excerpt:

"Mehr als ein Jahrhundert lang, von 1900 bis 2006, waren Kampagnen des gewaltlosen Widerstands bei der Erreichung ihrer Ziele mehr als doppelt so effektiv * wie ihre gewaltsamen Pendants. Durch die beeindruckende Unterstützung der Bürger, deren Aktivismus sich in Form von Protesten, Boykotten, zivilem Ungehorsam und anderen Formen der gewaltlosen Nichtzusammenarbeit äußert, tragen diese Bemühungen dazu bei, Regime von ihren wichtigsten Machtquellen zu trennen und bemerkenswerte Ergebnisse zu erzielen, selbst im Iran, in Birma, auf den Philippinen und in den Palästinensischen Gebieten.

Erica Chenoweth und Maria J. Stephan kombinieren statistische Analysen mit Fallstudien zu bestimmten Ländern und Gebieten und beschreiben detailliert die Faktoren, die den Erfolg solcher Kampagnen ermöglichen und manchmal auch ihr Scheitern verursachen. Sie kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass gewaltfreier Widerstand weniger Hindernisse für moralische und physische Beteiligung und Engagement darstellt und dass ein höheres Maß an Beteiligung zu größerer Widerstandsfähigkeit, größeren Möglichkeiten für taktische Innovationen und zivilgesellschaftliche Störungen (und damit zu einem geringeren Anreiz für ein Regime, seinen Status quo aufrechtzuerhalten) sowie zu Loyalitätsveränderungen bei den ehemaligen Unterstützern des Gegners, einschließlich Mitgliedern des militärischen Establishments, führt.

Chenoweth und Stephan kommen zu dem Schluss, dass erfolgreicher gewaltfreier Widerstand zu dauerhafteren und innerlich friedlichen Demokratien führt, die weniger wahrscheinlich in einen Bürgerkrieg zurückfallen. Auf der Grundlage einer reichhaltigen Beweisführung vergleichen sie auf originelle und systematische Weise gewaltsame und gewaltfreie Ergebnisse in verschiedenen historischen Epochen und geografischen Kontexten und entlarven den Mythos, dass Gewalt aufgrund struktureller und umweltbedingter Faktoren entsteht und dass sie notwendig ist, um bestimmte politische Ziele zu erreichen. Stattdessen, so stellen die Autoren fest, sind gewaltsame Aufstände selten aus strategischen Gründen zu rechtfertigen."

E. Chenoweth (2011) *** (diesen Text fand ich besonders lesenswert)

... setzte sich u.a. auseinander mit dem Argument 'Nur schwache oder willensschwache Regime unterliegen bei gewaltlosen Aufständen' und schreibt:

"Das stimmt nicht. Viele gewaltfreie Kampagnen waren erfolgreich gegen einige der blutigsten Regime der Welt, auf dem Höhepunkt ihrer Macht. Die große Mehrheit der großen gewaltfreien Kampagnen im 20. Jahrhundert richtete sich gegen Regime wie das von General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbien, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Suharto in Indonesien und verschiedene imperiale Herrscher, die eindeutig an der Erhaltung ihrer Macht über ihre Kolonien interessiert waren.

Während des berühmten Rosenstraßen- Vorfalls in Berlin 1943 zeigten sogar die Nazis ihre Verwundbarkeit gegenüber gewaltlosen Protesten, als deutsche Frauen Proteste organisierten und sich den Maschinengewehren der SS entgegenstellten, um die Freilassung ihrer jüdischen Ehemänner zu fordern - ein kleiner Sieg gegen eines der völkermörderischsten Regime der Geschichte, der undenkbar gewesen wäre, hätten die Demonstranten zu den Waffen gegriffen."



(Alle Zitate maschinell aus dem Englischen übersetzt.)

* Anm. von mir: die Abweichung ggü. Bartkowski -s.o.- könnte sich dadurch erklären, dass dort nur von gewaltlose Kämpfen gegen *Besatzer* die Rede war, hier aber von gewaltlosen Kampagnen *allgemein*.

** <https://cup.columbia.edu/book/why-civil-resistance-works/9780231156820>

*** <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/24/think-again-nonviolent-resistance/>

Anm. von mir: Der Rosenstraßen-Protest ist hier wohl nicht ganz korrekt dargestellt: Belegt sind keine SS-Maschinengewehre, sondern "nur" Polizei-Aufforderungen zur Räumung. Die Freilassung der inhaftierten Juden war möglicherweise nicht auf die Proteste zurückzuführen. (Wikipedia)

 BartkowskiM_Ukrainians vs Putin - potential for nonviolent civilian based defense_ICNC 2021-12-27.docx	448 KB
 DazaF_Ukrainian nonviolent civil resistance in the face of war_IBIP & al 2022-11.pdf	2,5 MB

Gewaltfreie Zivilverteidigung (CF-II)

Hier noch ein spezieller Aspekt zum Thema:

Zivil-gewaltfreie Verteidigung gegen *kriegerische oder terroristische Angriffe von außen* (wie Ukraine und Israel) (im Unterschied zu Konflikten innerhalb eines Landes).

Ich habe nach Beispielen gesucht von (m.o.w. erfolgreichem) gewaltfreiem Widerstand gegen einen ausländischen Aggressor. Bei einem Teil der von Chenoweth & Stephan (2012) (siehe vorherige Mail) genannten Länder weiß ich nicht, worum es dort genau ging. Ein bisschen habe ich aber recherchiert und Folgendes gefunden:

- Dänemark im 2. Weltkrieg: Der Widerstand gegen die deutsche Besatzung war relativ erfolgreich. Das Beispiel ist vielleicht nur eingeschränkt übertragbar, weil die Deutschen anfangs relativ zahm auftraten (Dänen = "Germanen"). Später bekämpften die Besatzer den Widerstand aber immer brutaler. Trotzdem gelang u.a. die Rettung vieler Juden vor der Deportation. Zweite Einschränkung: der dänische Widerstand war nur teilweise gewaltfrei (z.B. auch Sprengstoff-Anschläge auf Aufenthaltsorte der Besatzer), aber die anderen Aktionen (z.B. Sabotage, Generalstreik) waren zumindest ein wichtiger Teil.
- Libanon 2005: Demonstrationen, auch Druck von Frankreich und USA, führten zum Abzug der syrischen Besatzungstruppen.
- Indien/Mahatma Gandhi: Dieser "Klassiker" ist ja eigentlich auch ein Beispiel eines Kampfes gegen Besatzer, auch wenn die Briten schon vorher lange im Land gewesen waren.

Ein paar Gedanken noch:

- Gewaltfreier Widerstand gegen einen ausländischen Aggressor sollte (theoretisch) in gewisser Hinsicht einfacher sein als bei inländischen Auseinandersetzungen, weil die ausländische Macht oft bei großen Bevölkerungsteilen unbeliebt bis verhasst ist.
- Wenn es nur wenige Beispiele geben sollte, liegt das vielleicht nicht daran, dass ein solcher Widerstand aussichtslos wäre. Gründe könnten sein, dass Staaten in der Regel eine Militärmacht besitzen, also diese Option *haben*. Und dass viele Regierungen (besonders die autoritären) kein Interesse daran haben, dass ihre Bevölkerung sich gewaltfrei engagiert. Denn solche Aktionen funktionieren ja wohl nur dezentral, m.o.w. eigenständig und freiwillig, können letztlich zur Emanzipation führen.
- Demgegenüber hat bei inländischen Konflikten die eine Seite (die der Aufständischen) oft gar keine oder nur wenig militärische Mittel zur Verfügung und ist in vielen Fällen gerade an Emanzipation interessiert.
- Als Bild zu diesem Thema hat man unwillkürlich vor Augen, dass sich ein paar unbewaffnete Leute Panzern entgegen stellen - geradezu ein Symbol der Aussichtslosigkeit. Ich denke aber, die entscheidenden Mittel gewaltfreier, ziviler Verteidigung sind andere: Nicht-Zusammenarbeit mit dem

Aggressor, Boykott (z.B. Steuer-Boykott), Streik bis zu Generalstreik, Informationskampagnen, Sabotage-Aktionen (gegen Sachen).

Dann ist noch die Frage, ob Gewalt gegen Menschen strikt ausgeschlossen werden soll. Z.B. von Widerständlern durchgeführte gezielte Attentate u.ä. wären vielleicht der "humanere" Weg im Vergleich zu einem Krieg mit vielen tausend Toten. Opfer, die meist mit der Entstehung des Konflikts gar nichts zu tun haben und nicht gefragt wurden, ob sie sich opfern wollen. Ich selbst tendiere aber zunehmend zur grundsätzlichen Ablehnung von Gewalt gegen Menschen (von Ausnahmen wie Hitler abgesehen). Neben ethischen auch aus weiteren Gründen: Gewalt wirkt ja eskalierend, liefert dem Gegner eine willkommene Legitimation seiner oft brutalen Maßnahmen ("Terrorismusbekämpfung"). Gewalt kann potentielle Unterstützer abschrecken, und kann sich negativ auf die Mentalität der Widerständler selbst auswirken.

- Ganz wichtig: Friedensfördernde Maßnahmen im Vorfeld.
 - Gesellschaftlich-pädagogisch: Keine Diffamierung und Benachteiligung von sozialen Gruppen. Soziale und Friedens-Kompetenzen als zumindest gleichberechtigtes Thema in den Medien und als Hauptfach in der Schule (z.B. statt "Deutschland muss kriegsfähig werden" und zunehmender Präsenz der Bundeswehr an den Schulen).
 - Politisch: die Bedürfnisse der "Gegenseite" berücksichtigen, wie Sicherheitsbedürfnisse (z.B. Russland), Anerkennung der Gleichberechtigung (z.B. Palästinenser *), u.ä.
- Ich glaube, dann würde es in vielen Fällen gar nicht erst zu Kriegen oder Terror kommen.

Scholarship & Research

Ukrainians vs. Putin: Potential for Nonviolent Civilian-based Defense

by *Maciej Bartkowski*



A group of protesters unfurled the Ukrainian flag and the inscription "Crimea is Ukraine, Ukraine is Europe" in English at the entrance of the National Museum in Prague to protest the annexation of Crimea by Russian separatist forces, December 2018. Source: [Jan Štěch/Wikipedia](#) (CC BY SA 4.0, unedited).

With more than 150,000 Russian troops staged along on the Ukrainian border, and also massing in Belarus and the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas, Ukraine is facing a potential full-fledged invasion by its larger authoritarian neighbor and the occupation of a sizable swath of its territory.

U.S. and Ukrainian intelligence services report that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not made up his mind yet about the invasion. However, time is of the essence. January and February are the most convenient months for Putin to invade because land remains frozen for easier and faster movement of heavy equipment including tanks, in the event that railways, bridges and roads are blown up.

If Putin decides to launch a full-scale military invasion, it will be because he thinks that he will achieve rapid military victory over his much more powerful forces over the Ukrainian army, even if the latter receives military support from the West. If he pushes his offensive all the way to Kiev, it would also signal his belief that the current Ukrainian government would be quickly removed from power and replaced by a puppet pro-Russian regime. Alongside is his view that the majority of the Ukrainian people would passively accept the Russian invasion and occupation in the same way the majority of the population inside Donbas and Crimea did from 2014 onward. After all, Putin claims Russians and Ukrainians are the same people and have simply been separated from each other by the Ukrainian nationalist elite. According to his rhetoric, once this elite is removed from power, Ukrainians would gladly accept reunification with Russia.

To influence Putin's calculus about the full-scale invasion, some in Ukraine and the West emphasize that Ukrainians are ready for protracted guerrilla warfare and that Ukraine could be for the Russian leader what Afghanistan became for the Soviets. However this scenario, if realized, would be equally painful for Ukrainians as it would be for Russians. After all, Afghanistan was left in ruins and hundreds of thousands of people were killed and became refugees, even if eventually they prevailed over their invaders.


Putin's assumptions are dangerous miscalculations with potentially terrible consequences for Ukrainians.

What would you do in case of a foreign armed invasion?

In 2015, the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted a representative [national survey](#)¹ that for the first time ever assessed Ukrainians' preferences for resistance in case of a foreign armed invasion and occupation of their country. The poll took place just after the Euromaidan revolution and the capture of Crimea and the Donbas region by Russian troops, when it could be expected that Ukrainian public opinion would be strongly in favor of defending the motherland with arms. The results, however, revealed surprisingly strong support for an alternative to an armed-defense type of resistance: **civilian-led nonviolent defense**. The survey showed that the most popular choice of resistance among Ukrainians was to join nonviolent resistance: 29% supported this choice of action in case of foreign armed aggression and 26% in case of occupation. In contrast, armed resistance was suppor-


ted by 24% and 25% respectively. See Figure 1. Only 13% of Ukrainians would behave in the way Putin would hope in case his troops invade Ukraine—do nothing.

Figure 1




It's one thing that more respondents selected civilian-led nonviolent resistance than any other option. It's even more remarkable that more than one-third of Ukrainians thought that this alternative type of resistance could be an effective means of defending their communities against a foreign adversary with a more powerful military. See Figure 2.

Figure 2




These results, interestingly enough, correspond closely with the historical record of anti-occupational struggles. The data show that between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent struggles against occupiers succeeded 35% of the time while armed resistance succeeded 36% of the time (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011). Neither type of resistance succeeded more often than it failed, but successful and failed armed resistance lasted on average three times longer than its nonviolent counterparts; always came with a huge human and infrastructural cost for the local population (e.g. Vietnam 1960s); had much lower probability of building democracy afterwards (Algeria 1962); and destroyed or traumatized civil society (e.g. Hungary 1956) whose strength and mobilization are needed for democracy building and its sustainability. In contrast, nonviolent resistance historically can succeed much faster than armed struggle (Nepal 2004); even failed nonviolent resistance more effectively preserves the fabric of civil society to restart a fight another day (Czechoslovakia 1968) and it has much higher chances of building democracy than successful armed resistance (Poland 1980s vs. Afghanistan 1980s and 2000s).

Figure 3a




Furthermore, according to the survey, those among Ukrainians who seek to protect territory are more willing to take up arms. Those seeking to protect their families and communities would rather turn to nonviolent resistance methods. See Figures 3a and 3b. There is a seemingly intuitive understanding among Ukrainians that armed resistance would inflict terrible costs on the local population. Potentially it makes better sense to use violent resistance far away from major urban centers where nonviolent resistance against occupiers could ensue in its stead.

Figure 3b



Ukrainians were also asked to choose specific types of armed and nonviolent resistance actions that they would be ready to join or undertake themselves. Clear majorities chose various nonviolent resistance methods—ranging from symbolic to disruptive to constructive resistance actions against an occupier—rather than violent insurgent actions. In essence, the results demonstrated that the human capital for civilian-based nonviolent defense among Ukrainians was more than three times larger than that for armed resistance. See Figure 4.


Figure 4



Key takeaways

So, what do these findings mean in the context of a potential military invasion and occupation of Ukraine by Russian forces? A few important takeaways include:

- Putin's belief that Ukrainians would rather go home and do nothing in the face of military aggression may be his biggest and politically most costly miscalculation in the event that he decides to launch a full-scale invasion and occupation of large parts of Ukraine;
- Ukrainians do not necessarily embrace the idea of an Afghan scenario in which an armed guerrilla movement wages warfare against invaders that is equally destructive for the local population. Instead, they view unarmed defense and resistance of the civilian population not only as a plausible alternative that can better protect the population and minimize human costs of violent conflict but also as a way to achieve victory against a militarily stronger opponent;
- Successful anti-occupation struggles have always been a whole-of-nation endeavor. Unarmed resistance has greater mobilization potential for a whole society to participate in diverse actions of defiance and noncooperation than armed resistance;
- Ukrainians show a surprising level of support for the type of resistance that neither Ukrainian policymakers nor their Western backers have considered in their defense planning: mass nonviolent resistance actions against a formidable military invader. This human potential for nonviolent resistance remains unfortunately untapped in the Ukrainian national defense strategy;
- How Ukrainians defend their country against a more militarily powerful adversary will determine Ukraine's future, including the survival of its nascent democracy. A protracted armed struggle often privileges a strongman to the detriment of democratic change. Ukraine's activated population can be tapped not only to effectively resist foreign aggression by means other than arms but also to prevent an internal coup and emergence of a domestic military dictatorship—possibly closely allied with Russia—from overtaking the country's young democracy.



A 2015 Lithuanian civilian-based defense manual, available both in [English](#) and [Lithuanian](#).

- Civilian-based defense is neither an uncommon historical practice nor an alien concept to contemporary national defense strategies. Such resistance was [a driving force behind various liberation struggles](#) including: American colonists' resistance against the British; Hungarians' mobilization against the Austrian Habsburg monarchy; Polish civil resistance against partitioning empires, including Tsarist Russia in late 19th century; and pro-independence movements in Egypt, India, Bangladesh, Ghana, Estonia, among others. Nowadays, efforts are underway to integrate comprehensive nonviolent civilian-based defense in the Baltic states. This is highlighted in the [specific recommendations for nonviolent defense strategies](#) put forward by a respected U.S.-based security think tank. And Lithuania has been at the forefront of these implementation efforts when in 2016 the government adopted a new military strategy for "reliable deterrence [that requires preparing citizens for] unarmed civil resistance, [including] fostering their will and resilience to information attacks, as well as ability to engage in a total resistance...of the whole nation". The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense issued two [preparedness manuals](#) on the "modes and principles of civil resistance" in its national defense.

¹ The survey results were first described and presented in English in the coauthored article "[To Kill or Not to Kill: Ukrainians Opt for Nonviolent Civil Resistance](#)" published in *Political Violence @ Glance*.

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UKRAINIAN NONVIOLENT CIVIL RESISTANCE IN THE FACE OF WAR

Analysis of trends, impacts and challenges
of nonviolent action in Ukraine between
February and June 2022

Felip Daza Sierra

<https://friedensbildungswerk.de/Bilder/pdf/Ukrainian-Nonviolent-civil.pdf> [Zugriff: 18.03.2023]



About this project

This report has been written by Felip Daza in the framework of a project led by the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP) and the International Institute for Nonviolent Action (Novact) for the study of nonviolent action in Ukraine between February and June 2022. This project has also received the invaluable support of the German Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena and the German peacebuilding NGO Corridors - Dialogue through Cooperation.

This project is also articulated with the International Coalition All for Peace which seeks to promote nonviolence and peace-building in Ukraine and the rest of the region.

The findings and conclusions are the result of the author's research, but have been enriched by contributions from a number of Ukrainian academics, activists and other political and social actors. None of them is responsible for the opinions expressed in the report, which are the final responsibility of the author.

About the author

Felip Daza is professor of social transformation, advocacy and human rights at Sciences Po Paris University and the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, and has worked for more than 15 years in the field of peacebuilding and nonviolent action in Southern and Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, North Africa and the Middle East.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ukraine is a country with more than 100 years of experience in nonviolent action. These strong capacities, combined with the informal networks of power at the local level and the country's vibrant associative fabric of self-organised communities and organisations for human rights advocacy, mediation and dialogue for conflict transformation, would explain, in part, the 'spontaneous' and widespread nonviolent civil resistance in the early stages of the Russian invasion, between February and June 2022, the period of study of this research.

The findings and conclusions of this report are based on the analysis of 235 nonviolent actions across the country and field research with over 55 interviews with Ukrainian political and social leaders, academics, and activists. Extensive community mobilisation and organising has crystallized into hundreds of nonviolent actions of protest [148], non-cooperation [51], and nonviolent intervention [36]. Geographically, the majority of actions were located in the southern *oblasts* (Kherson and Zaporizhia), which shows the persistence of nonviolent resistance in the areas under occupation. Temporarily, in February and March public protest actions dominated, but they were drastically reduced at the end of March due to the increase of repression and abduction of activists in the occupied territories. From April onwards, nonviolent resistance transforms into 'invisible' communicative actions, non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention creating structures of parallel self-government. The nonviolent civil resistance has been articulated in 7 areas of action with specific impacts and challenges:

1. OBSTRUCTIONS TO RUSSIAN MILITARY TARGETS

- Impacts: Nonviolent resistance has hindered some of the long-term military and political goals of the Russian authorities, such as the institutionalisation of the military occupation and repression in the occupied territories.
- Challenges: Nonviolent action has coexisted and often interacted with armed resistance. The boundaries between the two types of resistance are blurring in areas such as protection of civilians, alternative communication systems or building infrastructure against the advancing Russian military machine.

2. UNDERMINING THE PILLARS OF KREMLIN POWER

- Impacts: Persistent public demonstrations, even in traditionally pro-Russian Ukrainian regions such as Kherson, with extensive use of Ukrainian flags and symbols, has denied the Russian narrative of liberation of the Ukrainian people.
- Challenges: Despite its strategic importance, there has not been a sufficiently articulated strategy between nonviolent actions to demoralise the opponent and fraternization actions that could lead to an increase in desertions in the Russian army. Also, despite the fissures in Russian public opinion, for the moment, the conditions do not exist to establish processes of dialogue and joint actions with social actors on both sides of the conflict.

3. PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

- Impacts: Organised civil society has built a broad protection system for the development of tasks of evacuation, transport and relocation of the population, including financial support, counselling and psychosocial help for women, human rights defenders and other groups affected by the violence. In this sense, nonviolent action has made it possible to establish negotiation processes between local communities and the Russian army to protect the civilian population and public infrastructure.

- **Challenges:** The civil protection system is largely voluntary and has extensive training needs. Conscientious objection and defection of Ukrainian soldiers is a social 'taboo', involving stigmatisation and criminalisation. Unfortunately, nonviolent action could not develop in areas such as Mariupol, Irpin or Boucha, where violence and massacres of civilians prevailed.

4. COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

- **Impacts:** Communicative actions addressed to large audiences have been instrumental in preventing panic. Likewise, these type of actions have made it possible to maintain the nonviolent resistance in a clandestine way in the zones under occupation and to maintain the high morale of the population.
- **Challenges:** Repression in the areas under occupation has increased with arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and cases of torture causing increased fear among nonviolent activists.

5. STRENGTHENING LOCAL GOVERNANCE

- **Impacts:** Nonviolent action has had a significant impact on the preservation of the associative fabric, the empowerment of social actors at the local level and the improvement of coordination between local authorities and citizens. This impact has had a direct effect on the strengthening of local governance closely linked to the processes of political decentralisation and democratisation in Ukraine.
- **Challenges:** Beyond monitoring of war crimes, and youth volunteering initiatives, the vast majority of nonviolent actions at the local level have not been coordinated at the national level, causing communication problems and ineffectiveness. The tendency to centralise decision-making on the reconstruction of the country in the presidential cabinet marginalises the work carried out, needs and demands of social actors at the local level.

6. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SOCIAL COHESION

- **Impacts:** The solidarity of the Ukrainian people is an opportunity for encounter between the communities of the East and West. Nonviolent action has a fundamental character of cultural resistance, which contributes to the consolidation of Ukrainian identity.
- **Challenges:** There are extensive intra-family mediation needs and, as time progresses, there are serious risks of increased social polarisation. Mediation and dialogue-facilitation communities require support to respond to increased social mediation needs. Organisations working on monitoring Russian propaganda and developing new nonviolent narratives need support to penetrate public opinion. Low level of interest on the part of Ukrainian social actors to develop dialogue or conflict transformation initiatives with Russian or regional counterparts.

7. ACCOUNTABILITY

- **Impacts:** The robust war crimes monitoring infrastructure created by leading human rights organisations and advocacy centers in Ukraine has enabled the collection and verification of thousands of cases of serious violations committed by Russian troops. These actions have helped to prevent the defencelessness of the Ukrainian population affected by the war and have empowered citizens to denounce damage to physical infrastructure and abuses of the civilian population through various physical or virtual means.
- **Challenges:** The need to strengthen transitional justice processes by including mechanisms for truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation. One of the first challenges in this regard would be to also recognise the human rights violations committed by both sides of the conflict. It is also important to make progress in disaggregating data on human rights violations committed by soldiers, civilians, and Private Military and Security Companies.

INTRODUCTION

On February 26, 2022, images of Ukrainian citizens standing in the way of a column of Russian tanks in the small town of Bakhmach, northern Ukraine, went around the world¹. These were the first actions with which the nonviolent civil resistance to the Russian invasion began, and with it, this investigation. Like a colony of bees, Ukrainian society has spontaneously and courageously organised hundreds of nonviolent actions, from acts of civil disobedience to protection and evacuation of civilians. Massive nonviolent civil resistance could be decisive in ending the Russian occupation and advancing the process of democratisation and consolidation of a multi-cultural Ukrainian identity.

However, the drums of war have occupied the public debate and have gradually displaced nonviolent conflict transformation and peacebuilding initiatives. The propaganda machine has polarised warring societies², obscuring dissenting voices to war. The result is human catastrophe³, increased global military spending⁴ and new war economies in the old continent⁵ in the post-pandemic period.

This report examines the Ukrainian nonviolent civil resistance against the Russian invasion from February 24 to June 30, 2022 with the aim of identifying its organisational dynamics, its impact in the context of war and avenues of support to strengthen the social actors involved. Therefore, this study is not only addressed to actors aiming to support conflict transformation in Ukraine and the region, but to any organisation or individual involved or interested in nonviolent

action and conflict transformation. The Ukrainian experience is certainly unique, and from it we can learn new ways of civilian intervention in global crises without the use of weapons.

With this aspiration in mind, the report is structured in five sections. First, we define a conceptual framework of the ideas and political theories that justify the goals, dynamics, and outcomes of nonviolent action. Second, we identify the main background that shapes Ukraine's strong nonviolent resistance experience. Third, we analyse the evolution, characteristics and actors of nonviolent action in the country. Fourth, we describe the impacts nonviolent action has achieved so far, as well as the challenges it has faced. Fifth, we formulate a series of recommendations for political and social actors to support nonviolent civil resistance in Ukraine and the rest of the region.

Methodological note

This research echoes stories and testimonies of the protagonists of nonviolent action in Ukrainian civil society, to understand their motivations, challenges and strategies of resistance in a context of high risk and violence. In this way, the report adopts an empirical approach based on qualitative and quantitative data collection. On the one hand, we rely on field research conducted between 2 and 18 April 2022 where we collected data and testimonies through semi-structured individual interviews and focus groups with more than 55 political and social actors, including representatives of public and religious institutions, NGOs, self-organising groups, academic experts, among others. We have also conducted online interviews with activists from the temporarily occupied areas of Kherson and Melitopol, mainly. Most of these testimonies are referenced in the report, except in those cases where for security reasons it has been decided to keep them anonymous, in any case their profile and gender [m] male or [f] female are noted. On the other hand, we mapped 235 nonviolent actions recorded, verified and systematised from February 24 to June 30, which allowed us to identify trends in nonviolent action. Finally, we used other key texts on nonviolence in general, and popular mobilisation in Ukraine in particular, to argue and justify the results of the study.

¹ Action 3 of the Database of Nonviolent Actions in Ukraine [See Annex 1]

² Anton Oleinik. *War-time media reporting is shaping opinions about Russia's Ukraine invasion*. The Conversation, April 4, 2022. <https://theconversation.com/war-time-media-reporting-is-shaping-opinions-about-russias-ukraine-invasion-180107>.

³ See: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/07/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-4-july-2022>

⁴ For more information on European and global rearmament see: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-07-07/great-global-rearmament>; and the latest SIPRI data in 2021: <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time>.

⁵ Elise Vincent. *Macron Says France Must Enter War Economy Announcing Military Budget Re-evaluation*. Le Monde, June 14, 2022. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2022/06/14/macron-says-france-must-enter-war-economy-announcing-military-budget-re-evaluation_5986750_7.html

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: OBJECTIVES, MECHANISMS OF CHANGE AND METHODS OF NONVIOLENT CIVIL RESISTANCE

Conflicts are power struggles that can lead to violent or nonviolent confrontations. Both ways share social, economic, psychological or physical methods to achieve their goals (Beer, 2021). In armed conflicts we tend to think that taking up arms is the most effective option to win over the enemy, but in doing so we lose sight of the idea that “wars are the continuation of politics by other means”⁶. Nonviolence understands that behind these conflicts there are political and military decision-makers who make decisions that are obediently executed by the lower strata of the chain of command. For nonviolence, this classic scheme of monolithic power can be confronted from the principles of disobedience (de la Boëite, 2012; Thoreau, 2020).

Nonviolence is based on the consent theory of power. Gene Sharp bases nonviolent action on the thesis that a government or hierarchical system cannot maintain its power if the population disobeys and defies its orders (1973). Based on that political theory, we adopt the notion of nonviolent action as “those methods of protest, resistance, and intervention without physical violence in which group members do or refuse to do certain things” (Sharp, 1973). Unlike violent action, nonviolence aims to influence, without the threat or use of violence, the opponent’s actions, moral and psychological state, to change their perceptions of the conflict, to fraternize, and to persuade them to lay down their arms. The effectiveness of nonviolent

action depends on maintaining its dynamics and not being combined with armed resistance.

Acts of omission, commission, or a combination of both, cause changes in an opponent’s behaviour. This is what George Lakey (1968), and later Gene Sharp (1973), called “the mechanisms of change” and which are classified into four effects: 1) conversion: the opponent fully accepts the demands of the nonviolent group; 2) accommodation, which involves a partial acceptance of the demands according to a cost/benefit calculation of the opponent; 3) coercion, which involves a surrender to the opponent due to the collapse of one or more “pillars of power” of the opponent; 4) disintegration, which happens when the mass population supports a parallel power structure causing the collapse of the old regime. Michael Beer adds a fifth mechanism based on the withdrawal of the opponent permanently or temporarily ceding its power influence to the nonviolent group (2021). For example, persistence in noncooperative actions can affect the ability of a higher authority to exercise its power and provoke shifts in loyalty and even defections among its political supporters or members of the military (Beer, 2021). For these reasons, authors such as Wallace consider nonviolence to be more effective than violent action in coercing the adversary, since when the pillars of his power are undermined it can force him to negotiate or withdraw from the battlefield (2017).

But nonviolence is not only a strategic calculus to win over an opponent (nonviolent struggle), it is also effective in protecting civilians (nonviolent intervention) or defending communities (nonviolent defence) while preserving our moral commitments (Wallace, 2017). This study contemplates the multiple capacities of nonviolence to persuade the aggressor to stop the violence, while protecting the population affected by the violence, preserving their social fabric and value system.

In this sense, it is relevant for our study to analyse the democratising action of nonviolence. Democratisation processes start from a notion of power that allows communities to create and choose what kind of society they want to live in according to their individual preferences (Welzel, 2009). Nonviolence builds collective power

⁶ This idea was coined by the father of military strategy and author of the treatise *On War*, Carl Von Clausewitz.

through the definition of a vision and goals in a horizontal structure that allows for positive interactions and the sharing of resources in an egalitarian manner [Ganz, 2010]. For Saul Alinsky, the father of community organising, the democratic concept of people power is not simply the development of nonviolent campaigns, but the transformation of power relations [2010]. It is about building social change from the very structure of nonviolent organisation and action in relation to the ethical principle of coherence between means and ends. Nonviolent movements contribute to the transformation of practices and systems of authority from a ‘‘bottom-up’’ logic for the development of a new type of governance [Beissinger, 2002; Ulfelder 2005]. Mahatma Gandhi considers that kind of power as *swaraj* meaning self-government [1997] for the creation of a new social contract based on truth [satyagraha] and nonviolence [ahimsa].

Erika Chenoweth and Maria Stephan’s study ‘‘Why Civil Resistance Works’’ based on an analysis of 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006, concludes that nonviolent campaigns are more effective than violent action in achieving their goals and that they contribute more effectively to the development of lasting, peaceful democracies [2011]. One of the key elements for this success is the ability to mobilise broad and diverse sectors of the population in a decentralised manner. The broad participation of society is a reflection of popular power and gives legitimacy and sustainability to

the processes of social transformation pursued by nonviolent movements.

In order to analyse the nonviolent actions identified in Ukraine, we start from the classification made by Gene Sharp in 1973, including adaptations made by Michael A. Beer [2021]. Thus, we understand that nonviolent methods are divided into the following three categories:

- **Protest (acts of expression):** mainly symbolic actions intended to persuade your opponent or third parties to change your policies, or to express your rejection of or dissent from them;
- **Non-cooperation (acts of omission):** based on the withdrawal of support for, or obedience to, the opponent’s practices at the political, social and economic level;
- **Nonviolent intervention (acts of commission):** where the nonviolent group adopts a more proactive role with interposition actions to prevent the opponent from achieving its objectives or the creation of parallel structures of self-sufficiency or governance that marginalise the opponent’s actions while responding to the needs of the population.

Beer rightly points out that the three types of methods can contain a confrontational [coercive] or constructive [persuasive] approach. This table summarizes the universe of nonviolent actions according to this author:

The Universe of Nonviolent Methods

Resistance behaviour	Nature of tactical incentives	
	Confrontation [coercive]	Constructive [persuasive]
Saying [Acts of expression or protest]	<u>Protest</u> Communicative actions of denunciation and coercion (e.g.: a march).	<u>Appeal</u> Communicative actions to reward or persuade (e.g.: fraternization)
Failure to Do [Acts of Omission or Non-cooperation]	<u>Non-cooperation</u> Refusal to obey orders/laws or perform behaviours not expected according to a given system (e.g.: strikes and boycotts)	<u>Refrain</u> Interrupt or suspend a planned or ongoing action to reward or persuade (e.g.: suspend a strike).
Doing or creating [Acts of commission or nonviolent intervention]	<u>Disruptive intervention</u> Direct action that confronts another party to stop, interrupt or change their behaviour (e.g.: a blockade)	<u>Creative intervention</u> Direct action that shapes or builds alternative behaviours and institutions or takes over existing institutions (e.g.: parallel self-governance structures).

For each of the categories, Gene Sharp detailed numerous specific actions and they are collected in the well-known list of 198 methods of nonviolent action⁷. Also, for the study at hand, we have considered the updates of nonviolent methods by Michael Beer (2021) and Mary Joyce and Patrick Meier⁸, to better adapt to the Ukrainian context and current technological progress. First, cultural resistance actions linked to artistic and literary expression (murals, comics, logos, cartoons, music, sculpture, cinema, documentaries, guerrilla and invisible theatre, poetry, pamphlets, publications, peace spaces, etc.) that are combined with the symbolic acts defined by Sharp as displaying flags, symbols of a cultural identity or singing anthems of a nation. Second, civil resistance actions articulated with human rights activism and respect for international law. This would include actions to defend specific human rights, monitor war crimes or protect human rights defenders. Third, civil resistance actions with a gender perspective that allow for the reinforcement of the role of women and gender/sexual minorities while developing innovative and effective actions for the creation of horizontal networks, maintenance of nonviolent discipline, processes of civil disobedience, among others. These actions increase the solidarity and internal cohesion of groups while confronting the power relations of the patriarchal system. Fourth, traditional nonviolent actions are amplified by new technological ones, including livestreaming actions, hashtag trending, influencing internet search engines, maptivism, QR codes or self-surveillance, among others.

⁷ The complete list can be accessed through this link: <https://www.aeinstein.org/nonviolentaction/198-methods-of-nonviolent-action/> The Global Nonviolent Action Database provides definitions and examples of each of the actions defined by Gene Sharp. The project was carried out by the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Swarthmore College in the United States. The online database can be accessed at: <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/browse-methods>

⁸ Joyce and Meier's contribution takes the form of the "Civil Resistance 2.0" project, a database that updates the list of 198 nonviolent methods in Gene Sharp from a new-technology point of view. The information of this project can be accessed at: <https://commonslibrary.org/198-nonviolent-methods-upgraded/>

UKRAINE: 100 YEARS OF NONVIOLENT CIVIL RESISTANCE

Ukraine is a nation that has been under the control of multiple powers. The rule of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian or Soviet Empires did not prevent the development of diverse identities and sub-cultures. According to Yevhen Hlibovytsky, professor at the Ukrainian Catholic University: "Ukraine is a melting pot of multiple identities that retain their differences but act as a single eco-system"⁹. The permanent resistance to external influences has contributed to the development of a certain anarchic character in Ukrainian identity. Professor of the Kyiv School of Economics, Ivan Gomza, stated that there is an ongoing debate in Ukraine about the anarchic character of the nation¹⁰. In fact, between the fall of the Tsarist empire in 1917 and the Russian revolution, one of the most important anarchist movements in Europe developed in Ukraine. Between 1917-22, Nestor Makhno led this movement with the creation of self-organised communes in the southern and eastern regions of the country¹¹. In that period, various groups fought for their independence and the creation of new forms of self-organisation. In 1917, for example, one of the first large popular rallies in the country was organised in Kherson to demand Ukrainian identity and the right to self-government¹².

The Soviet Union tried to subjugate the Ukrainian people through centralised power structures and the notion of global Soviet identity based on communist principles. To avoid this process the Ukrainian people developed two types of institutional structures: on the one hand, inefficient state institutions;

and on the other hand, informal networks and institutions of power for self-governance, where local institutions went beyond their original functions, such as parishes acting as banks¹³. This contributed to the creation of centres of social capital and horizontal networks based on trust. According to Professor Olga Onuch "Ukraine had more dissidents per capita than any other Soviet republic; it was a very active place"¹⁴. Despite Soviet repression, Ukraine developed an intellectual and cultural movement that claimed Ukrainian identity, starting with the poetry of one of the fathers of Ukrainian literature, Taras Shevchenko [1814-1861], with influential authors such as the feminist writer Lesya Ukrainka [1871-1913] or Vasyl Stus, representative of the Sixtiers dissident movement, who died in a concentration camp in 1985¹⁵.

The collapse of the Soviet Union did not give way to a new society, but it did give way to the beginning of important social mobilisations. Independence from the Soviet Union on 24 August 1991 did not translate into the construction of a new social contract as the new Ukrainian state inherited centralised power structures, social distrust and a security system accustomed to repression¹⁶. Ukrainian society was traumatised after decades of totalitarianism, but within it there were strong mechanisms of community resilience. A year before Ukraine's declaration of independence, on 2 October 1990, student movements occupied the streets of Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv to demand an end to Moscow's control in what became known as the Granite Revolution¹⁷. The mobilisations were supported by other dissident sectors such as the People's Movement for the Reconstruction of Ukraine

⁹ Yevhen Hlibovytsky (professor at the Catholic University of Ukraine), interview with the author, Kolomyia, 17 April 2022.

¹⁰ Ivan Gomza (professor at Kyiv Economics School), interview with the author, Lviv, 17 April 2022.

¹¹ Isobel Koshiw. *Putin terrors affects everyone: Anarchists join Ukraine's war efforts*. The Guardian, May 26, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/26/putin-anarchists-join-ukraine-war-effort>.

¹² Деметрій Білий. Херсон - це Україна: сказано ще у 1917 році. IstPrava, February 5, 2022. <https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2022/04/18/161222/>

¹³ Yevhen Hlibovytsky (professor at the Catholic University of Ukraine), interview with the author, Kolomyia, 17 April 2022.

¹⁴ Coilin O'Connor and Halyna Tereshchuk. *The Revolution on Granite: Ukraine's First Maidan*. Radio Free Europe, October 15, 2020. <https://www.rferl.org/a/the-revolution-on-granite-ukraine-s-first-maidan-kyiv/30892599.html>

¹⁵ Stephen Komarnycky. *Transreading Ukrainian Poetry: the first course inspiring English writers through Ukraine's literature*. Euromaidan Press, 11 Nov. 2019, <https://euromaidanpress.com/2021/11/19/transreading-ukrainian-poetry-the-first-course-inspiring-english-writers-through-ukraine/>

¹⁶ Yevhen Hlibovytsky (professor at the Catholic University of Ukraine), interview with the author, Kolomyia, 17 April 2022.

¹⁷ Coilin O'Connor and Halyna Tereshchuk. *The Revolution on Granite: Ukraine's First Maidan*. Radio Free Europe, October 15, 2020. <https://www.rferl.org/a/the-revolution-on-granite-ukraine-s-first-maidan-kyiv/30892599.html>.

[Rukh] who demanded political reforms for the country. The youth adopted a common aesthetic and displayed Ukrainian symbols. The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of economic reconstruction and the recovery of Ukraine's historical memory¹⁸.

The exposure of electoral fraud in the presidential elections in favour of the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich triggered the well-known Orange revolution between November 2004 and January 2005. This popular movement was part of the well-known colour revolutions started in 2000 in Serbia by the student movement Otpor [Resistance]. Some authors called them "electoral revolutions" because they are characterised by united opposition fronts against electoral fraud, broad social mobilisations, independent media coverage and election observation and education campaigns [Bunce and Wolchik, 2006]. Western powers such as the United States and Canada supported both technically and financially the development of the opposition against Yanukovich, especially in the development of: independent media such as *Ukrainska Pravda*; and NGOs such as "Pora and Committee of Voters of Ukraine" to conduct domestic election observation, to expose fraud and mobilise citizens to defend their votes [McFaul 2007; Stewart 2009]. For its part, in line with the "Black Knight" political theory¹⁹, the Russian Federation supported outgoing President Leonid Kuchma's autocratic methods of maintaining control of the country, through campaigns to discredit the opposition and organised civil society [McFaul 2007]. External interference contributed to the development of civil society, but also led to processes of instrumentalisation and polarisation of civil society [McFaul 2007; Stewart 2009]. In any case, although the Orange revolution did not bring about a social transformation of the country, it did contribute to the empowerment of its social actors. As McFaul argues, the leadership, ideas and mobilisation came from the Ukrainian people [2007].

The Euromaidan revolution was a turning point in Ukraine's social transformation. Euromaidan, also known as the Revolution of Dignity, broke out on 30 November 2013 when the police brutally repressed students demonstrating in Maidan Square in Kyiv against President Yanukovich's decision not to sign the political association and free trade agreement with the European Union. A huge popular mobilisation took place in the capital of the country. Protesters occupied Maidan for months resisting attacks by Ukrainian security forces, including the use of live ammunition. At least 130 people were killed during the revolution. On January 28, 2014 Yanukovich was defeated for the second time. Unlike the Orange revolution, the mobilisations spread throughout the country and their demands were broader, including the defence of socio-economic rights, ethno-linguistic demands and political reforms to end corruption. However, the mobilisations were characterized by a certain lack of planning and nonviolent discipline, which led to violent acts in Kyiv, but also in other regions of the country, such as the clash in Odessa that ended with the death of 48 activists, mostly anti-Maidan²⁰. This violence, provoked a certain delegitimisation of the movement and polarisation among the citizenry, which was exploited by radical voices at both ends of the political spectrum [Onuch, 2015]. Along these lines, the Kremlin refused to accept the process of social emancipation of the Ukrainian people and forced the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in the Donbass in 2014. The Russian authorities read the fall of Yanukovich and the Association Agreement with the European Union as a significant advance of Western influence in Eastern Europe and therefore a threat to their political interests and regime²¹. During the capture in both territories by separatist militias supported by Russian hybrid units [Schmid, 2019], there were multiple protest and deterrent actions against the Crimean pseudo-referendum²².

¹⁸ Yevhen Hlibovytsky (professor at the Catholic University of Ukraine), interview with the author, Kolomyia, 17 April 2022.

¹⁹ The "Black Knight" political theory considers that authoritarian regimes promote similar political systems beyond their borders. For more information see: <https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/PaperDetails/16064>

²⁰ Shaun Walker. *Tensions run high in Odessa on anniversary of deadly clashes*. The Guardian, May 2, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/02/odessa-ukraine-second-anniversary-clashes>

²¹ Yevhen Hlibovytsky (professor at the Catholic University of Ukraine), interview with the author, Kolomyia, 17 April 2022.

²² Peter Ackerman; Maciej Bartkowski. *Challenging annexation: in*

as well as the separatist movements in the Donetsk and Luhansk territories²³.

Social pluralism in Ukraine increased after Euromaidan, with the emergence of self-organised groups at the local level. Social mobilisation moved from Kyiv to other cities and towns of the country where hundreds of new groups focused on local issues such as the development of infrastructure and public services, denouncing cases of corruption, recovery of green spaces and historic buildings, among others. Euromaidan activists joined broader initiatives such as 'Save Old Kyiv', 'Green Front' in Kharkiv or the 'General Protest' in Odessa. At the local level, 'hubs' of organisations independent of public authorities and international donor funds were created. Activist Pavlo Kaliuk stated how popular self-organisation in Euromaidan "created a physical space of meeting and exchange of ideas and values that subsequently advanced many projects"²⁴. In 2016, Pavlo contributed to the establishment of the Podolianochka self-organised community in Kyiv with the aim of institutionalising Euromaidan and developing real democracy based on community processes, people's unity and cultural change²⁵. These informal groups launched numerous volunteer initiatives and sought donations to help combat the Russian aggression in Donbass in 2014 [Shapovalova, 2018]. These grants were

Social pluralism in Ukraine increased after Euromaidan, with the emergence of self-organised groups at the local level. Social mobilisation moved from Kyiv to other cities and towns of the country where hundreds of new groups focused on local issues

intended to support the Ukrainian army with food, clothing, defence equipment and other materials²⁶.

Furthermore, the violent events that took place in Euromaidan strengthened the power of extreme right-wing groups. However, these actors were co-opted by the Ukrainian authorities and integrated into the country's military structures. Proof of this was the resistance of the Azov groups in Mariupol during the Russian invasion. This process of co-optation drastically reduced the political influence of the extreme right in

the country. As Professor Ivan Gomza states, the political power of the far right in Ukraine is non-existent. According to his data, out of 12,000 seats in local councils in Ukraine, only 2 have been occupied by representatives of far-right political groups. However, during the field research we observed symbols traditionally linked to the Ukrainian

far right such as the red and black flag. For Professor Gomza, this symbol used by ultra-orthodox nationalism in the past, has been integrated into the national identity and reinterpreted by the collective imagination as a symbol of liberation and resistance²⁷.

The political decentralisation of the country as an opportunity for democratic development at the local level. After Euromaidan a new period was inaugurated based on the construction of a new social contract and the consolidation of Ukrainian identity²⁸. The package of reforms approved in the post-Euromaidan period, especially those aimed at the development of

Crimea, the referendum that wasn't. Open Democracy. 22 March 2014. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/civilresistance/challenging-annexation-in-crimea-referendum-that-wa/>.

²³ Александр Савицкий, "Тысячи жителей Донецка вышли на митинг за единство Украины". DW, 18 April 2014.

<https://www.dw.com/ru/%D1%82%D1%8B%D1%81%D1%8F%D1%87%D0%B8-%D0%B6%D0%B8-%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B9-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%86%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%B2%D1%8B%D1%88%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8-%D0%BD%D0%B3-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE-%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%8B/a-17576783>

²⁴ Pavlo Kaliuk [member of the self-organised community of Podolianochka], interview with the author, Kyiv, 6 April 2022, Kyiv.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Since 2014, multiple organisations have been involved in helping the Ukrainian army. Some initiatives created in 2014 have been reactivated in this new phase of the war. Some examples can be found at: <https://www.comebackalive.in.ua/>. For more information on the dynamics of this type of support see: <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/4/21/ukraine-a-war-funded-by-peoples-donations>.

²⁷ Ivan Gomza [professor at Kyiv Economics School], interview with the author, Lviv, April 17, 2022.

²⁸ Yevhen Hlibovytsky [professor at the Catholic University of Ukraine], interview with the author, Kolomyia, 17 April 2022.

local governance, was used by community organisations to demand greater transparency and accountability. New tools and strategies of citizen participation were developed at regional and local levels such as monitoring access to public information, participation in participatory budgeting and development of new channels of citizen participation [Shapovalova, 2019]. However, these social demands provoked conflicts at the regional and local level with political actors of the former regime. According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, 2018 saw an increase in serious attacks against activists at the local level²⁹. At the national level, several organisations achieved significant improvements in access to public information. To continue these political reforms, these organisations created the Center of United Actions³⁰, a Kyiv-based organisation specialised in monitoring the functioning of executive and legislative bodies, strengthening the processes of political decentralisation, and promoting citizen participation.

In 2015 the Ukrainian population expressed greater support for nonviolent resistance than armed resistance to defend their country. A year after the outbreak of the war in Donbass, the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology conducted a nationwide survey to find out the preferences of citizens on the use of nonviolent or violent methods in case of aggression or occupation of the country. The results showed that, in situations of armed aggression against Ukraine, 29 per cent of respondents supported nonviolent civilian resistance against 24 per cent who favoured a military response. While in situations of occupation, 26% supported nonviolent methods against 25% who considered it more useful to take up arms. The survey went deeper into these aspects by asking citizens which method they would choose in case of defence of the population or defence of the territory. In the first case, 55% supported nonviolent civil resistance to defend their communities, against 45% who supported armed resistance. In the second case, 63% considered the military response to defend the territory more effective,

against 37% who advocated nonviolent action³¹. The Ukrainian experience of nonviolent civil resistance is combined with vibrant mediation and human-rights-advocacy communities. Armed conflicts and threats to Ukrainian sovereignty in recent decades have marginalised the discourse of peacebuilding. This situation has led to the transformation and grouping of organisations in this sector into two main areas: the defence of human rights and the promotion of dialogue in conflict situations. According to Tetiana Kyselova, professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy National University, the latter group is made up of, on the one hand, the ‘‘Community of Mediators’’, a professional group that has been developing since the 1990s and is formed of more than 3,000 professionals grouped in the National Association of Mediators, and on the other hand, of the ‘‘dialogue facilitators’’, composed of 20 organisations that have focused on the development of dialogue processes in Eastern Ukraine after 2014 [2017]. Both communities possess robust capacities for the development of dialogue and mediation processes at the macro and micro levels in post-conflict prevention, management and rehabilitation situations. Strong human rights organisations have done fundamental work for the democratic development of the country such as denouncing cases of corruption and protecting human rights defenders, including supporting activists in the territories of Crimea and Donbass³². Also, note should be taken of how women’s organisations have been gaining more and more relevance in conflict transformation processes [Kyselova, 2019].

In conclusion, the Ukrainian social and associative fabric has developed extensive capacities in conflict transformation, human rights advocacy and nonviolent action that would explain the civilian response to the invasion of Ukraine. As Professor Onuch states, from Soviet times to the present, most Ukrainian civilian resistances against their aggressors have been mostly nonviolent [2015].

³¹ The original KIIS results can be found at <https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=546&page=1>. The translation of the results was done by Maciej Bartkowski and Alina Polyakova and can be found in this article: <https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/10/12/to-kill-or-not-to-kill-ukrainians-opt-for-nonviolent-civil-resistance/>.

³² Examples include the work done by the Crimean Human Rights Group (<https://crimeahrg.org/en/>), the Crimean Tartar Resource Center (<https://ctrcenter.org/en/>), or the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (https://khpg.org/en/page_1) among others.

²⁹ See: <https://khpg.org/en/1538092313>

³⁰ See: <https://centreua.org/en/>

ANALYSIS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION IN UKRAINE

"We act like a colony of ants."
Pavlo Kaliuk, community member
self-organised Podolianochka

CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIAN INVASION

To date, the Ukrainian war has developed in two military phases. The Russian invasion began on February 24, 2022 with the entry of troops through the *oblasts* of northern Ukraine (Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy), eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk) and southern Ukraine (Kherson and Zaporizhia). In the first three weeks of the invasion, Russian advances in the southern regions contrasted with the Russians' difficulties in achieving their objectives in the north. Finally, in early April, the Kremlin withdrew its troops from the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions. But by then the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions were under military occupation, while the pressure from the east and west on Mariupol increased. The second stage of the Russian invasion began in April with the aim of controlling the Donbass and connecting the southern corridor over the ruins of Mariupol. On May 18 this city capitulated and the fighting was concentrated in the east of the country. In June, when we finalised the elaboration of this report, the Russian troops continue their advance in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, hold the front of Mikolaiv and Zaporizhia, and stalk Kharkiv, while they continue launching missiles against numerous cities of the country, including Kyiv³³.

The penetration of Russian troops into the north of the country led to sieges of major cities and forced the displacement of civilians. Given the strategic interest of the Russian authorities in

the most important cities, many citizens of those locations moved to smaller towns in the northern regions. In the first weeks of the invasion, Russian troops took control of large parts of the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions, establishing a heavy siege on their capitals until their withdrawal at the beginning of April. The smaller towns did not have time to react and were quickly occupied. The repression in those municipalities varies in its severity, from the control of the movement of their inhabitants to the massacres of civilians in Irpin, Boucha and Borodyanka.

The Russian army has developed systems of military occupation in the southern regions of Ukraine. Since March 2022, the Russian army has gradually established a system of military occupation in towns in the Kherson and Zaporizhia *oblasts* with the aim of institutionalising repression³⁴. In practice, this process has involved: the control of public buildings with the raising of Russian flags, abductions of mayors and other local political and social leaders, concentration of military troops to control demonstrations and acts of public protest, and the creation of a network of collaborators and attempts to organise separatist pseudo-referendums.

The Russian invasion and repression has led to widespread displacement of civilians to safe areas of the country, especially the central and western regions of Ukraine. Approximately 18 million people have been forcibly displaced, 7 million of which are internally displaced³⁵, while 11 million have left the country³⁶.

EVOLUTION AND TRENDS IN NONVIOLENT ACTION

Trends in nonviolent action

The beginning of the invasion has provoked a great deal of community mobilisation and organisation. The vast majority of Ukrainian social actors, from human rights organisations to the self-organised groups that had developed

³³ To follow the progress of the military campaign see the periodic reports of the Institute for the Study of War: <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates>

³⁴ Igor Semivolos (director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies), interview with the author, Kyiv, 5 April 2022.

³⁵ See: <https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/internally-displaced-persons>

³⁶ For updated and segregated information see the United Nations website for Ukrainian Refugees: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>



Interview with Pavlo Kaliuk, member of the self-organised community of Podolianochka [Kyiv]. Source: Lorena Sopena

since Euromaidan, youth centers, parishes and ordinary citizens, have organised to protect the population and stop the advance of Russian troops. The mobilisation has been organised spontaneously at the local level in line with the informal networks and trusting relationships characteristic of Ukrainian society. The deputy director of the Center of United Actions said: “many things are happening in communities thanks to local leaders [...] trust is established among ordinary people, not with administrations”³⁷. Community organiser Pavlo Kaliuk explained that: “during the war, the community has strengthened its capacity for self-organisation, it acts as a defensive barrier [...] as if it were a colony of ants”³⁸. New self-organised groups have also emerged. Activist Anastasia Kozlortseva explained that they organised an autonomous group for humanitarian work in the village of Kirovohrad based on

The mobilisation has been organised spontaneously at the local level in line with the informal networks and trusting relationships characteristic of Ukrainian society

trust relations and made up of volunteers, some from state-level NGOs³⁹.

Community organisation has been based on sophisticated information and communication networks that have facilitated the organisation of actions. Oksana Malchenko, coordinator of the organisation ‘Equal Opportunities Space’ in Sumy, detailed that communication systems

were created between local NGOs and farmers, who knew the territory well, to find secondary roads to allow humanitarian aid to enter the city during the siege by Russian troops. These information networks have spread beyond the borders of Ukraine, ac-

tivists in Sumy [m] confirmed that they received information from friends and neighbours in Russian villages on the border with information about the movements of Russian machinery and troops⁴⁰. Telegram has been one of the most widely used communication tools. A journalist

³⁷ Mariya Levonova [deputy director of the Center of United Actions], interview with the author, Lviv, 15 April 2022.

³⁸ Pavlor Kaliuk [member of the self-organised community of Podoliano-chka], interview with the author, Kyiv, 6 April 2022, Kyiv.

³⁹ Anastasia Kozlortseva [volunteer of the self-organised group of Kirovohrad], interview with the author, Kyiv, 6 April 2022.

⁴⁰ Sumy activist, interview with the author, Sumy, 7 April 2022.

from the online magazine Tsukr explained that, in a few days, its subscribers grew from 2000 to 25000 people⁴¹. This type of communication has enabled the rapid mobilisation of volunteers. The head of the municipal youth centre in Chernivtsi said that any request for help mobilised a dozen volunteers in a short time⁴².

Ukrainian Youth Activism

Young activists have contributed significantly to solidarity and community organising in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Volunteer Service⁴³ has mobilised more than 120,000 young people since the beginning of the war through platforms such as Volunteer Platform⁴⁴. With the outbreak of the war, the Platform also started to disseminate appeals for humanitarian aid. Another initiative has been the creation of the Palyanytsia Platform⁴⁵, the largest base of organisations helping IDPs, the elderly, and children to be evacuated, providing shelter, food and medicine.. Palyanytsia has systematised more than 900 organisations and initiatives. During the first weeks of the war, the Volunteer Service launched the Telegram chatbot @VolunteersHotlineBot, which responded to thousands of queries from citizens and NGOs. Its managers have provided daily support to people needing help or looking for volunteers for their initiatives. As well as the My Phone Friend initiative⁴⁶, to support over 500 mostly elderly single people by phone. Volunteers call their beneficiaries twice a week to check on their condition and provide support.

The national All Ukrainian Youth Centers network⁴⁷ of more than 300 youth centers across the country have been engaged in extensive humanitarian relief work. During our visit to Ukraine, the network was beginning to develop a programme of social cohesion, community resilience and nonviolent action to advance the reconstruction of the country⁴⁸.

Solidarity is a key element in understanding community resilience and the capacity to act in a context of war. During the bombings in Chernihiv, a teacher organised neighbours to protect themselves and focus on daily routines to avoid panic: "We organised ourselves to fetch bread, to control access to the house or even to prepare traditional borsch soup. Gradually, the feeling of collectivity grew"⁴⁹. Local activists and local media focused on daily stories of nonviolent resistance, spreading positive messages and explaining the war from a humorous perspective to keep morale high and fight fear.

Geographical and temporal distribution of non-violent actions

According to the categories of nonviolent methods defined in the conceptual framework of this report, we observe that of the 235 nonviolent actions registered between February 24 and June 30, 2022: 148 would fall into the category of "Protests [acts of expression]", 51 actions in the category of "non-cooperation [acts of omission]" and 36 actions of "nonviolent intervention [acts of commission]".

Geographically, the actions have been distributed as follows: 20 actions in the northern regions of the country (Chernihiv, Sumy and Kyiv); 191 actions in the south (Kherson, Zaporizhia and Odessa); 9 actions in the east (Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk); 9 actions in the west (Lviv, Chernivtsi, Rivne), and 6 actions at the state level or in more than one region. On the one hand, the vast majority of nonviolent actions have been organised locally without coordination at the national level. On the other hand, actions related to civilian protection, humanitarian aid, war crimes monitoring, mass nonviolent communication, and hacker-activism have involved supra-local and even state-level coordination. In this sense, professionalized NGOs in the fields of human rights, humanitarian aid and protection have done nationwide work. However, even networks of national organisations act independently at the local level, such as the All Ukrainian Youth Centers, which facilitates coordinated actions among their members, but does not establish any hierarchical structure.

⁴¹ Journalist [Tsukr media], interview with the author, Sumy, 7 April 2022.

⁴² Svitlana Oleksiychuk [Director of the Chernivtsi Youth Centre], interview with the author, Chernivtsi, 3 April 2022.

⁴³ See: <https://volunteer.country/>

⁴⁴ See: <https://platforma.volunteer.country/>

⁴⁵ See: <https://www.palyanytsya.info/>

⁴⁶ See: <https://befriend.volunteer.country/>

⁴⁷ See: <https://youthcenters.net.ua/en/>

⁴⁸ Artur Kadelnik [deputy director of All Ukrainian Youth Centers], interview with the author, Kyiv, 5 April 2022.

⁴⁹ Artur Kadelnik [deputy director of All Ukrainian Youth Centers], interview with the author, Kyiv, 5 April 2022.

On the one hand, the high concentration of actions in the south of the country responds to the persistent public protests and non-cooperation in Kherson and Zaporizhia *oblasts*. In the north, on the other hand, the Russian troops did not manage to control the main cities of that region, Kyiv, Chernihiv or Sumy, and withdrew at the beginning of April, reducing the nonviolent actions against the occupant.

The temporal evolution of nonviolent actions has responded to the different stages of the Russian military campaign. In February, 17 actions were organised, most of them related to nonviolent physical intervention to hinder the advance of troops and military machinery such as, for example, the manipulation of traffic direction signs, construction of barricades and anti-tank infrastructure, and physical interposition of citizens in front of tanks and military convoys in different points of the north and south of the country. Most of the nonviolent actions identified were concentrated in March [131]. That month, the actions of nonviolent interposition and obstruction continued, two large initiatives of monitoring war crimes and networks of protection of the civilian population began. In mid-March, the first non-cooperation actions in the South and actions of political denunciation and boycott began in Kyiv and Lviv against multinational companies with economic activities in the Russian Federation. However, the great majority of the nonviolent actions [96] were demonstrations and public rallies where flags and symbols of the country were displayed to demonstrate the rejection of the invasion and to claim Ukrainian nationality. April was a month of inflection, as with the withdrawal of troops in the north and the increase of repression in the areas under occupation nonviolent actions were reduced [23], especially those linked to public protest. Although some noncooperation actions continued, such as the removal of Russian flags from public buildings in the southern towns of Kherson, Nova Kakhovka, Kakhovka and Velyki Kopani, in general nonviolent resistance went more underground. Protective actions also continued with evacuation processes from the zones of military confrontation and under occupation, where many activists who led protest actions during February and March decided to flee because of increased repression. In May,

most actions were organised in the south of the country, Kherson and Zaporizhia [35 actions]. Public protest was reduced, but instead communicative actions such as graffiti, hanging yellow and blue ribbons, distribution of leaflets, among others, increased significantly. In that month a significant number of actions of disobedience to the Russian military orders were identified in numerous cities of the Kherson w such as Novotroitske, Beryslav, Kakhovka, Ozeriany, Sokolohirne and Novohryhorivka. These actions were led by teachers and civil servants who refused to collaborate with the occupier. Finally, in June, of the 29 nonviolent actions recorded, 15 involved methods of non-cooperation. The actions were concentrated in Kherson and Zaporizhia, but specific actions of disobedience were also identified in Crimea and Luhansk. On this occasion, in addition to the refusal of civil servants to collaborate with the occupier, there were also medical personnel and workers who refused to pay taxes or work on public works.

DYNAMICS OF NONVIOLENT ACTIONS

Protest actions [expression]

Actions of expression have been the most numerous according to the mapping carried out [148], especially those related to demonstrations and public rallies [73]. These types of actions were mainly located in the southern regions of the country. The large number of actions carried out in the cities of Kherson, and to a lesser extent in Kahovka, with almost daily demonstrations during the month of March, stands out.

One of the most significant characteristics of the protests during the war was the use of Ukrainian symbols such as the Ukrainian flag or the singing of the national anthem [49]. The popular mobilisations of rejection of the occupation were closely linked to the reclaiming of their identity. Such rejection contradicted the Russian narrative that the “special operation” was aimed at liberating the Ukrainian people⁵⁰. Several local residents of Chernihiv and Melitopol

⁵⁰ Some examples of the Russian narrative can be identified in the following news: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/russia-plans-to-continue-its-operation-in-ukraine-till-achieving-all-goals/2630593> ; <https://regnum.ru/news/3517085.html>



Demonstration in Slavutich with the unfurling of a large Ukrainian flag.
Source: Nataliia Hantimurova

explained that on 9 March, the anniversary of the national poet Taras Shevchenko's birthday, they lost their fear and began to demonstrate⁵¹. In cities like Beryslav or Energodar, public rallies were held at monuments or other places symbolic of Ukrainian identity. In Melitopol some demonstrations were organised after the mass in the city's Orthodox church. In fact, according to the demonstrators the parish priest of the church played an important role in the protest actions against the Russian occupation⁵².

Slavutich, the city of the Chernobyl workers⁵³

Slavutich is a small town 40km from the Belarusian border with about 25,000 inhabitants. On 26 March its mayor announced the occupation of the town and the death of three of its residents⁵⁴. Despite the tragic news, local residents spontaneously rallied in the town hall square through phone calls and messages on social media. Denys Masliy, a member of the Slavutich municipal council, said: "There were no leaders, there were no instructions, but peo-

ple knew what to do"⁵⁵. Although the Russian military tried to disperse the demonstration by force⁵⁶, the demonstrators maintained their nonviolent discipline. According to demonstrators [m] interviewed in the locality, people began to sing the Ukrainian anthem and advance fearlessly towards the Russian troops⁵⁷. Larysa Masliy, director of the Slavutich art-cultural complex described: "Even in confrontations you have to go with a smile on your face because it provokes, in my opinion, a shock in the occupier"⁵⁸. The rapid and massive response of the citizens of Slavutich forced a negotiation process with the Russian military. According to the president of the local municipal council, Natalia Hantimurova: "The negotiation with the occupier took place during the protest. Not after, but during. We were almost up against the wall. On one side, the Slavutich community and on the other, the troops of the Russian Federation"⁵⁹. During the negotiation process, the people of Slavutich secured the release of the mayor and allowed the Russian soldiers to check that there were no weapons in the town. On 28 March the Russian army left the town.

⁵¹ Local residents of Chernihiv and Melitopol, interviews by author, Chernihiv and online, 23 March and 9 April 2022.

⁵² Melitopol activist, interview with author, online, 23 March 2022.

⁵³ The testimonies of this case were recorded in the following audio-visual capsule: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MOP3fbFzhS8>

⁵⁴ Ярослав Прищеп, *Мер Славутича заявив про окупацію міста росіянами*. Suspilne, February 26, 2022 <https://suspilne.media/221976-mer-slavuticha-zaaviv-pro-okupaciю-mista-rosianami/>

⁵⁵ Denys Masliy [member of the Slavutich Municipal Council], interview with the author, Slavutich, 10 April 2022.

⁵⁶ See: <https://t.me/suspilnechernihiv/7654>

⁵⁷ Slavutich activists, interview with the author, Slavutich, 9 April.


⁵⁸ Larysa Masliy [Director of the Slavutich Art-Cultural Complex], interview with the author, Slavutich, 10 April 2022.

⁵⁹ Natalia Hantimurova, [Chairperson of the Slavutych City Council], interview with the author, Slavutych, 10 April 2022].

Geographical distribution of Nonviolent Actions in Ukraine (February - June 2022)



Interactive map of
nonviolent actions



Types of Nonviolent Actions in Ukraine (February - June 2022)*

* For detailed information about the actions please see Annex I

Protest and disuasion 148 actions



Nonviolent intervention 51 actions



Non-cooperation 36 actions





From April 2022, clandestine communication actions with graffiti have multiplied in the occupied areas. Graffiti with the slogan 'Kherson is Ukraine'. Source: Sulpine Kherson.

At the end of March, repression in the areas under occupation increased, leading to a decrease in public protest actions. According to Oksana Hliebushkina, an activist and member of the Kherson-based organisation “New Generation”, Russian military were replaced by Russian police specialised in crowd control⁶⁰. The increase in arbitrary arrests and kidnappings led to an increase in fear among the population. Actions began to take place in other symbolic places, but further away from the center and with smaller numbers of people. According to our record of nonviolent actions, from April onwards, public demonstrations in the occupied areas were drastically reduced.

Gradually, the nonviolent civil resistance adopted a strategy based on clandestine and ‘invisible’ actions. In mid-March, graffiti, Ukrainian flags, posters and leaflets promoting disobedience against the occupation began to appear [approximately 48 actions of communication to wide audiences and symbolic public events]. These clandestine actions aimed to

communicate that the resistance was still alive, while keeping the morale high and reducing the danger for the activists. In this framework, the initiative “Yellow Ribbon”⁶¹ appeared on social networks proposing to hang ribbons with Ukrainian colours in the municipalities of the country, especially those under occupation. The actions were called from social networks but the actions were physically executed all over the country including Crimean cities such as Yalta, Simferopol, Kerch and Alupka. These types of actions were instrumental in keeping morale high while reducing the danger to activists. It is significant to note that actions under occupation have a very defiant character to the Russian authorities and involve high risks for activists, especially in those areas where repression has become institutionalised as in the Crimean peninsula.

At the online level, the role of memes to ridicule the opponent or explain in a simple way aspects of the situation of the armed conflict also stood out. Toronto TV, an independent media group

⁶⁰ Oksana Hliebushkina (coordinator of the organisation New generation), interview with the author, online, 28 April 2022

⁶¹ The initiative appears on Facebook under anonymity: https://m.facebook.com/yellowribbonUA/?_rdr

based in Ivano-Frankivsk but with thousands of followers on social media, focused on explaining war stories from another point of view. According to Maksym Scherbyna, editor of Toronto TV: “You can’t be afraid of what makes you laugh”⁶². This media outlet also monitored propaganda but ruled out producing counter-narratives aimed at Russian audiences due to the complexity of penetrating these spaces.

Non-cooperative actions (omission)

In mid-March, nonviolent action shifted from actions of expression to actions of omission. Some 51 non-cooperation actions were organised between February and June 2022, of which 16 were social actions, 14 economic non-cooperation actions and 21 political actions. The vast majority in the regions of Kherson and Zaporizhia. The first actions identified in Berdyansk and Kherson are actions of social disobedience where Russian humanitarian aid was refused.

The actions of non-cooperation and disobedience of the population have played a fundamental role in stopping this process of institutionalisation of the military occupation. Igor Semivolos, director of the Center for Middle East Studies and member of the Ukrainian Peace-building School, considered that in the areas under occupation, non-cooperation with the occupier, cultural resistance and the protection of activists were priorities⁶³.

The omission actions have been structured in three categories. First, the actions of social non-cooperation, organised between May and June 2022, were led by the education sector. Some examples were the actions of Melitopol high school principals who submitted their resignation letters⁶⁴; teachers of Ozeriany, Sokolohirne and Novohryhorivka schools who refused to instruct students under Russian programs⁶⁵; workers of Kherson State University

who left their physical jobs⁶⁶. Nonviolence expert Semivolos detailed that such acts of disobedience in many cases involve situations of persecution and repression, including abductions and forced disappearances by Russian occupiers⁶⁷. Other acts of social disobedience came from health workers in hospitals or ordinary citizens who refused to hand over their personal data for the population census.

Second, in political non-cooperation actions local administration officials have refused to collaborate with the occupiers. In Enerhodar, for example, members of the City Council resigned in order not to legitimize a possible Russian administration⁶⁸, while in the town of Kyrlyivka, Mayor Ivan Maleev publicly refused to cooperate with the invaders⁶⁹. In some cases civil servants abandoned their physical jobs, but maintained a certain level of work to serve the public. According to information gathered during the fact-finding visit to Ukraine, the central government has instructed local administrations not to cooperate with the military occupation.

Mayors in many cases have been a target of the Russian army with several cases of kidnappings⁷⁰. These situations have provoked public reactions as in Melitopol where the kidnapping of Mayor Ivan Fedorov and activist Olga Haisumova provoked a demonstration of thousands of people in front of the town hall demanding their release and the rejection of the new Russian administration led by Galina Danilchenko⁷¹. These actions of political omission have been combined with a large number of actions [12] where symbols of the Russian occupation have been removed from public buildings in localities under occupation, such as flags of the Russian Federation or of the former Soviet Union.

Finally, actions of economic non-cooperation began to be organised at the end of March with the participation of multiple actors [14]. For

⁶² Maksym Scherbyna [Toronto TV editor], interview with the author, Ivano-Frankivsk, April 14, 2022.

⁶³ Igor Semivolos [direct from the Center for Middle East Studies], interview with the author, April 5, 2022.

⁶⁴ See action 145 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

⁶⁵ See action 210 from the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

⁶⁶ See action 225 from the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

⁶⁷ Igor Semivolos [direct from the Center for Middle East Studies], interview with the author, April 5, 2022.

⁶⁸ See action 133 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

⁶⁹ See action 136 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

⁷⁰ See: <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3520564-eight-city-village-and-settlement-heads-held-in-russian-captivity.html>

⁷¹ See action 89 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

example, on March 29, Russian troops occupied the offices of the National Council of TV and Radio in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia, all workers resigned en bloc to avoid broadcasting Russian propaganda⁷². On 12 June, local entrepreneurs in Kyrylivka refused to pay taxes to the local administration⁷³. In this type of actions, the boycott and denunciation actions of activist Mykola Davydiuk, who organised 6 actions against multinational companies with operations in Russia, namely Renault, Metro, Auchan and Nestle, stand out. The actions were carried out at the company's offices in Ukraine or at the company's home embassies, with the aim of having a meeting with company representatives or diplomatic staff and getting their message of denunciation across. The actions had a media impact on various TV channels, social networks and in the press⁷⁴.

Nonviolent intervention actions (commission)

In the first days of the Russian invasion, international media showed impressive images of Ukrainian citizens stopping the advance of Russian tanks. In our database we recorded at least 14 actions of nonviolent interposition. In cities like Bakhmach, Grodno or Koryukivka⁷⁵, in the north of the country, the first actions of blocking Russian tanks took place and in many occasions forced the columns of Russian tanks and military convoys to deviate or return the way they had come. Such blockade actions have been supplemented by actions of nonviolent obstruction throughout the country, i.e. the construction of barricades and anti-tank infrastructure and other military machinery. In the Podolianochka community of Kyiv, we directly observed cultural centers transformed into real assembly plants of this type of infrastructure. The construction of anti-tank blockades have

been spontaneous actions of citizens, but in most cases in coordination with the Ukrainian army and territorial defence units⁷⁶. In the category of nonviolent obstruction actions 3 actions in Kherson *oblast* are also included, where the Ukrainian State Road Agency, Ukravtodor, and ordinary citizens manipulated road signs to obstruct the movement of Russian troops or to show rejection of the invasion⁷⁷.

The backbone of the civilian protection system

From east to west, a complex system of humanitarian and evacuation corridors has developed, supported by humanitarian organisations, self-organised groups, activists and other social actors such as parish priests, although, as international organisations specialised in the field of international protection indicate, most groups are made up of volunteers with limited capacities⁷⁸.

The main evacuation corridors have had ramifications to high-risk areas, such as areas under occupation. Although these processes were coordinated with the authorities and the army, residents in occupied territories have reportedly not received clear information from the authorities to leave these areas.

Furthermore, social organisations and activists have supported in this sense. In this process it is necessary to highlight the role of the main Ukrainian humanitarian organisations Vostok SOS⁷⁹, Donbass SOS⁸⁰ and Crimea SOS⁸¹ and the work of centers for the defence of rights that have focused efforts on the protection of activists. According to Tetiana Pechonchuk

⁷² See action 143 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

⁷³ See action 223 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

⁷⁴ Press dossier with the media impact of the boycott actions:

https://24tv.ua/nestle-krivava-korporatsiya-posibnikiv-puti-na_n1918635, <https://apostrophe.ua/ua/news/society/2022-03-22/vo-lvove-politolog-provel-effektnuyu-akciyu-protesta-protiv-deyatelnosti-renault-v-rossii/263489>, <https://life.znaj.ua/ru/423019-ukrajinskih-ditey-vbivayut-za-ti-groshi-yaki-prodovzhuyut-platiti-u-ro-siji-zahidni-kompaniji-mikola-davidiuk>, <https://novosti.politeka.net/uk/373468-putin-finansiruet-etu-voynu-ne-tolko-na-prodazhe-gaza-i-nefti-no-i-na-nalogi-evropeyskih-kompaniy-nikolay-davidiuk>

⁷⁵ See action 3, 10 and 11 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

⁷⁶ The territorial defence units are bodies of volunteers and reservists armed and trained by the Ukrainian government to support the country's armed forces at the local level. These units were created from the National Resistance Law which was passed in 2021, but in the course of 2022 incorporated new amendments to better respond to military needs in the context of war. For more information see: <https://voxukraine.org/en/voluntary-formations-of-the-territorial-defence-forces-of-the-armed-forces-of-ukraine-are-key-to-national-resistance-and-should-be-treated-as-such/>. You can also access the law through this link: <https://lips.ligazakon.net/document/t211702?an=2>

⁷⁷ See action 8, 12 and 17 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

⁷⁸ Nonviolent Peaceforce. *Ukraine Mission Assessment. Preliminary Findings. May 2022*. <https://nonviolentpeaceforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Ukraine-Mission-Assessment-Preliminary-Findings.pdf>

⁷⁹ See: <https://vostok-sos.org/en/>

⁸⁰ See: https://www.donbasssos.org/about_en/

⁸¹ See: <https://krimsos.com/en/>

of the Centre for Human Rights Zmina⁸² in May 2022 they were tracking 163 cases of abducted activists, journalists, human rights defenders and local authorities⁸³. Other organisations such as Civil Network OPORA⁸⁴ had useful information for cross-checking checkpoints or other basics⁸⁵. While the Center for Civil Liberties⁸⁶, in addition to having monitored and denounced people illegally detained throughout the country⁸⁷, has developed a decentralised communication platform known as Euromaidan SOS⁸⁸ with more than 100,000 subscribers where it has shared information on humanitarian corridors and activated a permanent telephone line to provide practical security information.

In this context, it is important to highlight the crucial role played by women activists. Nina Potarska, coordinator of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom⁸⁹, said that thanks to the invisibility that women gain in war, there have been women who have led the tasks of evacuation and protection in the Kharkiv, Zaporizhia or Donbass regions⁹⁰. In addition to these tasks, there have also been activists such as Oleh Baturin who was kidnapped in Kherson and later released. He has shared his experience in order to help others to escape from these areas.

The evacuation network has been linked to a network of shelters to accommodate people who have escaped from high-risk areas. Women's organisa-

tions such as the Center for Women Perspectives⁹¹ have set up several shelters in the west of the country for women victims of gender-based and sexual violence. These centres have also provided psychosocial support services.

In the besieged areas in the north of the country, Chernihiv and Sumy, local activists organised information networks with farmers and woodcutters to identify safe access routes into the city to bring in humanitarian aid such as medicines and other commodities

Commission actions have focused on creating alternative communication systems [3] for different needs. In the besieged areas in the north of the country, Chernihiv and Sumy, local activists organised information networks with farmers and woodcutters to identify safe access routes into the city to bring in humanitarian aid such as medicines and other commodities.

New technologies have been useful in creating these information networks, the decentralised Euromaidan SOS network is an example of a collaborative support network where citizens asked for and offered help. In Kherson, anonymous activists developed a collaborative map showing checkpoints, barriers and other obstacles created by Russian occupation troops⁹². Telegram has been one of the most widely used tools for organising groups at local and regional levels, although there was a risk of access by Russian agents. However, the most sensitive groups were closed, such as the Telegram group used by Kyiv neighbourhood communities such as Podolian-ochka to report possible saboteurs. The group developed a system for recognising saboteurs on the streets of the neighbourhood during the period when Russian troops were stalking the city⁹³.

On a more complex level, we have observed forms of parallel self-governance in towns in Enerhodar, Hi Prystan and Kherson where

⁸² See: <https://zmina.ua/en/>

⁸³ Tetiana Pechonchuk [director of the Centre for Human Rights Zmina], interview with author, online, April 11, 2022.

⁸⁴ See: <https://oporua.org/>

⁸⁵ <https://oporua.org/news/viyna/23961-kilka-porad-dlia-tikh-khto-vyizhdzhaie-z-okupovanih-teritorii-ia-ne-privernuti-uvagi-voroga>

⁸⁶ See: <https://ccl.org.ua/en/>

⁸⁷ See: <https://ccl.org.ua/en/claims/euromaidan-sos-informacion-sheet-on-illegal-detention-of-activists-in-the-occupied-territories/>

⁸⁸ See: <https://www.facebook.com/EvromaidanSOS>

⁸⁹ See: <https://www.wilpf.org/focus-countries/ukraine/>

⁹⁰ Nina Potarska [national coordinator of the Women International League for Peace and Freedom], interview with the author, Kyiv, 11 April 2022.

⁹¹ See: <http://www.women.lviv.ua/en/>

⁹² See action 129 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1]. https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?ll=46.67017833028436%2C32.62929833248872&z=14&mid=1I3J9lase66D7gr1MK_SO-hqyOWQlxv9n

⁹³ See action 105 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

citizens have organised themselves to provide community security services against possible theft or vandalism in their communities⁹⁴. During field research in the north of the country we also collected testimonies about the exchange of information between Ukrainian and Russian neighbours near Sumy about troop movements and Russian military machinery⁹⁵.

Organisations with extensive experience in the defence of human rights developed a war crimes monitoring system in March. The war crimes monitoring infrastructure has been composed of three initiatives that worked in a coordinated way at the level of information exchange for the protection of victims of these abuses and to avoid duplication of efforts. First, the SAM Coalition⁹⁶ brought together 30 organisations with extensive experience in defending and protecting human rights in Ukraine, including in the Donbass region and Crimea. The Coalition has worked in a rigorous, systematic and coordinated way collecting evidence through the Berkeley Protocol⁹⁷. Second, the Center for Civil Liberties, Helsinki Human Rights Organisation and Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group have established the Tribunal for Putin initiative⁹⁸ to also collect evidence on extra-judicial killings, torture, rape, enforced disappearances and particular repressions against vulnerable groups such as LGBTI communities, Roma, among others. Third, Civil Network OPORA has set up the RussianCrime.org platform⁹⁹ for the secure online submission of war crimes cases by citizens, including a network of offices for the collection of testimonies from refugees in transit or located in Poland. The three groups have developed coordination mechanisms to avoid duplication of cases and the transfer of information to international bodies and instruments such as the International Criminal Court or the Moscow mechanism of the OSCE, as well as the Ukrainian, Polish or Lithuanian prosecutor's office¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁴ See actions 74, 75 and 102 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine (Annex 1).

⁹⁵ Activist [m], interview with author, Sumy, 7 April 2022.

⁹⁶ See: <https://www.sam.in.ua/en>

⁹⁷ See: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/OHCHR_BerkeleyProtocol.pdf

⁹⁸ See: <https://khpg.org/en/1608810279>

⁹⁹ See: <https://russiancrime.org/main-page>

¹⁰⁰ Daniel Boffey and Piotr Sauer. *Ukraine prosecutors ready to launch first war crimes trials of Russia conflict*. The Guardian. May 11, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/11/ukraine-prosecutors-ready-launch-first-war-crimes-russia-conflict>

IMPACTS AND CHALLENGES OF NONVIOLENT CIVIL RESISTANCE

*"If you knock on a door, the door will open."
Teacher from Chernihiv*

In this section we analyse the main impacts and challenges of nonviolent resistance in the period under review, according to the 'mechanisms of change' outlined in the conceptual framework at the beginning of this report. The urgency of demonstrating the positive impacts of nonviolent action in order to maximise its positive effects and minimise its negative ones does not obviate the need to continue to evaluate the results of these methods in the medium and long term.

OBSTRUCTIONS TO RUSSIAN MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

One of the most important impacts of non-violent civil resistance has been to curb the long-term goals of the Russian authorities in the occupied territories. On the one hand, in the early stages of the occupation, in cities like Kherson, the daily demonstrations forced the Russian army to dedicate more troops and the use of police specialised in crowd control to consolidate its control inside the cities. This situation weakened their ability to mobilise troops to the east and establish defensive positions outside the cities to stop attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On the other hand, as repression increased and public protests decreased, non-cooperation actions have been key to stopping the institutionalisation of the military occupation in the Kherson and Zaporizhia

As repression increased and public protests decreased, non-cooperation actions have been key to stopping the institutionalisation of the military occupation in the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions


regions. The actions of political non-cooperation carried out by mayors and civil servants of the local administration help to prevent the organisation of separatist pseudo-referendums of these localities. Social non-cooperation actions carried out by the educational sector prevent the plans of cultural assimilation of the Ukrainian population from developing. While the actions of economic non-cooperation have prevented the Russian army from collecting taxes or building public infrastructure to strengthen its defensive positions on the borders of Kherson and Zaporizhia.

In other regions of the country, nonviolent civil resistance has allowed the massive participation of social actors and shown a high capacity of versatility to adapt and obstruct the different phases of the military campaign. In the early stages of the invasion in northern and southern Ukraine, nonviolent interposition and obstruction of tanks and military convoys slowed the advance of Russian troops. In addition, alternative communication systems were effective for the recognition of pro-Russian agents and saboteurs in cities such as Kyiv, Chernihiv or Sumy, weakening the military objectives to control those cities. Although it is difficult to evaluate it precisely, the nonviolent civil resistance has contributed to stopping the invasion in the north of the country.

However, one of the most crucial challenges faced by nonviolence in Ukraine has been the interaction with armed resistance. Civil-military cooperation has been promoted by the Ukrainian authorities to stop the Russian invasion through various strategies¹⁰¹. In this framework, civil-military actions have been developed such as the exchange of information to identify Russian saboteurs or positions, the construction of anti-tank infrastructures, the hacking of Russian digital infrastructures¹⁰² or

¹⁰¹ For more information see: <https://sprotiv.mod.gov.ua/en/english/>

¹⁰² See: <https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/2022/06/the-it-army-of-ukraine.html>



Local residents carry out a direct nonviolent interposition action to prevent the passage of a Russian military convoy in Kherson.
Source: Telegram

sabotage actions against military machinery¹⁰³. In this sense, it was common to find community centres where these infrastructures were being built and Molotov cocktails were being made.

During the field research, the majority of people interviewed did not see this cooperation as a problem, quite the contrary. This is understandable given the context of war and the high legitimacy of the army in the country. However, we have also observed how nonviolent civil resistance has preserved a field of independent action such as protest actions, non-cooperation or the creation of structures parallel to the military administrations of the occupying forces. In any case, it is essential to remember that the strategies of armed and nonviolent resistance are different. While the former uses the threat of harm to the life and health of the adversary, nonviolence aims to affect the moral and psychological state of the adversary. The effectiveness of nonviolence depends on separating the two strategies.

UNDERMINING OF THE KREMLIN'S PILLARS OF POWER

The rejection of the Russian invasion has a demoralising effect on Russian troops. Even those

Ukrainian regions traditionally pro-Russian and averse to Ukrainian nationalist narratives such as Kherson have shown a resounding rejection of the invasion with almost daily public protests including the massive use of Ukrainian flags and symbols to claim their nationality.

It is difficult to determine concretely to what extent nonviolent action has affected the pillars of power and fostered shifts of loyalty in the opponent. However, there are some indications that nonviolent civil resistance has affected the pillars of Kremlin power:

1. Multiple narratives of Russian propaganda. The Kremlin has used various reasons to justify its 'special operation in Ukraine' [fighting Nazism, supporting the people of the Donbass or confronting the West's expansionist and anti-Russian policies]. This reflects an improvised strategy of the Russian authorities to navigate between failures and difficulties in achieving their military objectives, without avoiding a loss of public confidence. Sociological experts in monitoring Russian propaganda stated that while in March the Russian population was discussing the war publicly, by mid-April they identify a broad tendency to shy away from the debate, which could indicate a sense of doubt about their government's inability

¹⁰³ See: <https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/en/2022/05/30/putins-nightmare-a-ukrainian-guerrilla-movement-has-emerged/>

to deal with the situation in Ukraine [Sociologists -m-, April 20, 2022, online].

2. Demonstrations inside Russia against the war in Ukraine have brought a swift and forceful reaction from the Russian authorities. Thousands of protesters were arrested in the early stages of the war¹⁰⁴ and prison sentences of up to 15 years were introduced for spreading “fake news” about the ‘military operation’¹⁰⁵. Despite this, opposition to the war in Russia has mutated into a more clandestine resistance such as the group ‘Feminists Against War’¹⁰⁶, while public displays of rejection of Russian military policy continue, including by officials in the Russian administration¹⁰⁷.
3. The defection of Russian troops is crucial for the end of the war because they can affect one of the Kremlin’s most important pillars of power: the army¹⁰⁸. Nonviolence may have the capacity to promote defections, and this practice has been promoted by the civilian population¹⁰⁹ and the Ukrainian national government¹¹⁰. The Russian authorities’ concern about desertions and mass mutinies in the Russian army has led to a change in the country’s criminal code that equates desertion with the notion of treason and carries penalties of up to 20 years in prison¹¹¹.

At the level of challenges, on the one hand, despite the importance of these processes, our analyses

reveal that there is not a sufficiently articulated strategy between nonviolent actions to demoralise the opponent and fraternization actions that could lead to a significant increase in desertions in the Russian army. In the register of nonviolent actions we recorded 148 protest actions, but only two actions of fraternization with the opponent.

On the other hand, the majority of people interviewed were not considering establishing dialogue processes with Russian social actors for the time being. According to some experts consulted, there is a clear weakness in understanding trends in Russian public opinion, this lack of analysis impedes understanding of the gaps in Russian propaganda and dissident movements inside Russia [Sociologists -m-, April 20, 2022, online]. Escalating nonviolent civil resistance beyond Ukrainian borders would be strategically key to affecting the pillars of the Kremlin’s power and force the Russian authorities to abandon the armed path to the resolution of the political conflict with Ukraine and the West.

PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Nonviolence has as its priority the defence of life and, in the context of the war in Ukraine, the protection of the greatest number of civilians and vulnerable people. In this framework we note that organised civil society has built a comprehensive protection system for the development of evacuation, transport and relocation tasks including financial support, counselling and psychosocial support to women, human rights defenders and other groups affected by violence. In this framework, coordination has been carried out through formal and informal communication systems, and the use of technological tools such as Euromaidan SOS, Volunteer platform or Palyanytsya. However, most of the people participating in this system are volunteers with training needs. We also note the need to support more systematically the protection programs of human rights defenders and activists resisting in the regions under occupation and other high-risk areas, who are responsible for leading nonviolent civil resistance and non-cooperation actions.

However, it is important to note that protection networks do not prioritise support for con-

¹⁰⁴ See: <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/03/22/more-than-15000-russians-have-been-arrested-in-anti-war-protests>

¹⁰⁵ See: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreading-fake-information-about-army-2022-03-04/>

¹⁰⁶ Maria Silina. “Russia’s feminists are protesting the war and its propaganda with stickers, posters, performance and graffiti.” *The Conversation*, 4 April 2022. <https://theconversation.com/russias-feminists-are-protesting-the-war-and-its-propaganda-with-stickers-posters-performance-and-graffiti-179989>.

¹⁰⁷ See: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/8/moscow-city-councillor-jailed-for-7-years-for-anti-war-comment>

¹⁰⁸ David Cortright. “Defections are crucial to ending Putin’s war – Russian soldiers looking for a way out need support”. *Waging Nonviolence*, 22 April 2022

<https://wagingnonviolence.org/2022/04/defections-russian-soldiers-crucial-to-end-putins-war-ukraine/>

¹⁰⁹ See action 1 and 29 in the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine [Annex 1].

¹¹⁰ See: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60748234>

¹¹¹ See: <https://tass.com/politics/1476023>

scientious objectors who refuse mobilisation. Conscientious objection to military service carries a 'social stigma'. According to data collected from various testimonies, there are practices of rejection of young people of military age in shelters¹¹² and attacks through social networks against people who have refused military mobilisation to high-risk areas¹¹³. This results in conscientious objectors having to escape administrative control (compulsory registrations) and minimise their movements to avoid military controls that could force them to join the army¹¹⁴. The Ukrainian system does not allow conscientious objection and criminalises desertion. In 2020, 1744 people were punished according to articles 407-409 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code¹¹⁵. The legal and social pressure on conscientious objectors is causing psychosocial problems, self-censorship and the inability to deal with this issue in the public arena. One of the most relevant cases is the political persecution of Ruslan Kotsaba, Ukrainian journalist and conscientious objector, who since the beginning of the war in Donbass in 2014 publicly promoted that the population will reject the military mobilisation in the east¹¹⁶. Since 2015 he has faced several court cases and has been imprisoned for 524 days, for being considered a 'Russian agent'¹¹⁷.

Organised civil society has built a comprehensive protection system for the development of evacuation, transport and relocation tasks including financial support, counselling and psychosocial support to women, human rights defenders and other groups affected by violence

In another line, nonviolent action has made it possible to establish negotiation processes between local communities and the Russian army to protect the civilian population and the infrastructure of the localities¹¹⁸. The most paradigmatic case was the actions carried out in the locality of Slavutich, near the border with Belarus, where the massive and rapid reaction of the population against the invasion on 26 March forced a negotiation process between the local residents represented by the local authorities and the Russian military for the liberation of their mayor and the withdrawal of the troops two days later. Also, as local activists have commented, the nonviolent, positive and determined attitude shown by the demonstrators against the occupation of their town created a 'shock' for the Russian soldiers¹¹⁹.

Unfortunately, this possibility of negotiation to protect the civilian population could not happen

in other contexts such as Mariupol or the western localities of Kyiv, Irpin or Boucha, or small towns of Chernihiv and Sumy, where nonviolent civilian resistance could not be organised due to the high level of violence exercised by the Russian troops resulting in terrible massacres of the civilian population. For these reasons, it is crucial for the population to analyse the risks and opportunities of nonviolent action involving contact with Russian soldiers. Slavutich's experience tells us that the presence of similar cultural elements and the absence of language barriers can facilitate dialogue, fraternization and interpellation to persuade the opponent to change his behaviour.

¹¹² NGO representative (f), interview with the author, Lviv, 15 April 2022.

¹¹³ Ukrainian soldier (h), interview with the author, Chernivtsi, 3 July 2022.

¹¹⁴ Conscientious objector (m), NGO representative (f), interviews with the author, Lviv, 16 April 2022.

¹¹⁵ UK Home Office. *Country Policy and Information Office*. June 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1088614/UKR_CPIN_Military_Service.pdf

¹¹⁶ Zoya Kravchuk. *Ukrainian journalist faces 15 years in jail after calls to boycott the draft*. Open Democracy, February 9, 2015. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukrainian-journalist-faces-15-years-in-jail-after-calls-to-boycott-draft/>

¹¹⁷ During the development of this research, Ruslan Kotsaba posted this video on social networks: https://youtu.be/hut0pAQ_XO

¹¹⁸ *Responding to the Russian invasion from the grassroots - An overview of conflict response practices by the Ukrainian civil society from February 24th to May 31st, 2022*. Iryna Eihelson, Maksym Ielighulashvili, Tetiana Kalenychenko, Tetiana Kyselova. - Kyiv, 2022. - 48 p.

¹¹⁹ Larysa Masliy [director of the Slavutich art-cultural complex], interview with the author, Slavutich, April 10, 2022.



The symbolic action of 109 empty trolleys in Lviv to denounce the murder of babies and children attracted the attention of international media.
Source: Roman Baluk

COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

The community resilience exercised by the population has been fundamental in resisting the war. We show how the following nonviolent methods have been effective in this regard:

1. Nonviolent actions of communication to large audiences through the press, TV, radio or the internet have strengthened community resilience. Media outlets such as Toronto TV, with thousands of subscribers on their social media channels, have produced nonviolent counter-narratives based on humour to prevent citizen panic;
2. Invisible nonviolent actions such as graffiti, leaflets and yellow-blue ribbons have kept resistance and morale alive, while reducing the dangers for activists at times of increased repression in areas under military occupation;
3. The support networks developed by neighbours in localities under occupation and siege have contributed to maintaining

community resilience. In this sense, we highlight how the work of youth centers in the localities has played a key role in supporting the most vulnerable groups.

Community resilience through nonviolent action also has the capacity to propagate itself and make other subjugated communities lose their fear. Indeed, the civil resistance shown by the Ukrainian people and viralised through social media has inspired other social actors. For example, in Crimea, between May and June 2022, communicative actions such as the distribution of leaflets, graffiti and yellow and blue ribbons have been organised. It will be key to study how nonviolent civil resistance against the Russian invasion strengthens dissident groups in the Crimean peninsula and the Donbass territories.

STRENGTHENING LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Nonviolent action has had a significant impact on the preservation of the associative fabric and the empowerment of social actors at the local level. This impact has had a direct effect on the strengthening of local governance, which



Oksana Malchenko played an important role in reinforcing community resilience during the siege of Russian troops in Sumy during the month of March 2022. Source: Lorena Sopena

is closely linked to the reform of political decentralisation in Ukraine¹²⁰. Specifically, local governance has been strengthened by:

1. the empowerment of local actors through the development of nonviolent actions through horizontal, self-organised and decentralised networks. These networks have been authentic schools of political training to improve decision-making processes, distribution of tasks and dissemination of information to the rest of the country;
2. increased social recognition of community organisations due to the role they have played against the Russian invasion, protection of civilians and community resilience. The coordinator of the Sumy community organisation “Equal Oppor-

tunities Space”, Oksana Malchenko, said that during the siege of the city they organised a network of community organisations to address the needs of the population. In the process, local and regional authorities asked for their support on several occasions in order to carry out their work¹²¹;

3. improved coordination between local authorities and citizens. The emergency context has created the conditions for greater collaboration between local authorities and citizens through various means such as the use of Telegram groups for the exchange of information on needs and volunteering. According to regional authorities, these information groups were essential for the distribution of humanitarian aid and the evacuation of the population¹²². On many occasions,

¹²⁰ For more information on the benefits and challenges of political decentralisation at the level of democratic development, conflict resolution and community resilience see the papers: <https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2020/07/17/ukraines-decentralisation-from-the-perspective-of-territorial-self-governance-and-conflict-management/> and <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-28/source-ukraines-resilience>

¹²¹ Oksana Malchenko [director of the NGO Equal Opportunities Space], interview with the author, Sumy, 7 April 2022.

¹²² Ivanov Dmytro, Deputy Head of the Chernihiv regional administration, Chernihiv 9 April 2022.



The local authorities of Slavutych address local residents to explain the situation of the city before the occupation of the Russian troops.
Source: Nataliia Hantimurova

the responses to these needs were carried out by the social organisations themselves, but the authorities played an important role in the coordination of aid. Also noteworthy is the cooperation between local authorities and public protest actions such as in Slavutych or non-cooperation in the occupied areas.

However, most local nonviolence initiatives were not coordinated with each other at the national level. This has led to problems of information, overlap, and ineffectiveness in certain situations such as identifying which *oblasts* were less overburdened and had better public services to offer displaced communities. The national authorities have not played an important role in this regard beyond the creation of spaces such as the National Resistance Center where they reported on the progress of nonviolent actions but also on the military campaign. On the other hand, professional organisations such as the Centre of United Actions, the Center for Civil Liberties or the All Ukrainian Youth Centers, among others, have done significant work in the exchange of information or the coordination of volunteers.

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SOCIAL COHESION

Cultural resistance is key to the process of national cohesion and unity. The vast majority of nonviolent protest actions recorded in this study have included the display of Ukrainian flags and symbols such as the traditional “vyshyvanka” embroidery. According to several academic experts, this war is consolidating Ukrainian identity¹²³. The resistance of Kherson or the solidarity that the eastern communities have found in the western communities has been an opportunity for encounter and dialogue to advance in the construction of a single Ukrainian national body¹²⁴.

However, during interviews in the eastern parts of the country, such as Chernivtsi and Lviv, we found that these relations are not without conflict. Decades of estrangement and exposure to different narratives have led to different percep-

¹²³ Ivan Gomza [professor at Kyiv Economics School]; Yevhen Hlibovytsky [professor at Ukrainian Catholic University], interviews with the author, Lviv and Kolomeya, 17 April 2022.

¹²⁴ Ivan Gomza [professor at Kyiv Economics School], interview with the author, Lviv, April 17, 2022.

tions, worldviews and expectations between communities in the west and east of Ukraine. During the research process we have identified how the country's mediation communities and dialogue facilitators were conducting interventions for the prevention and management of conflicts between host populations and internally displaced persons¹²⁵, as well as working on intra-family conflict or with the military¹²⁶. Interviews with representatives of these groups identified resource needs for systematic interventions¹²⁷.

In the process of nation-building there is the challenge of building a Ukrainian identity that is able to recognise the multiculturalism of the country. It is important to recognise that the Tatar community that opposed the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation in 2014¹²⁸ continues to demand an end to that illegal annexation and an end to the repression of the Tatar people still living on the peninsula¹²⁹. This community has participated in the nonviolent actions by displaying their symbols alongside Ukrainian flags¹³⁰. The Ukrainian authorities also seem to reinforce the multinational Ukrainian character with important political decisions such as the Law on the recognition of Crimean Tatars, Karaites and Krymchaks as indigenous peoples of Ukraine¹³¹.

Even so, nonviolent action experts warn that the pressure of the culture of war and the stress of war could provoke broad social conflicts in Ukraine as time goes on¹³². In a similar vein, the centralisation of decision-making at the presidential level could generate serious internal tensions by marginalising local actors

and needs outside the country's future reconstruction processes¹³³.

On another level, regional polarisation has increased due to the information war between the West and Russia. This polarisation hinders regional peacebuilding and nonviolent action initiatives. While there is some willingness of Ukrainian civil society organisations and activists to cooperate with their international counterparts and activists in Belarus, this is not the case with Russian organisations, at least for the time being.

Organisations working on monitoring Russian propaganda and developing new nonviolent narratives have shown their inability to penetrate this society with nonviolent counter-narratives. In the Western bloc, there are also difficulties in influencing the public debate which is dominated by militarist and pro-NATO narratives.

The mediation and dialogue facilitation community has ruled out dialogue initiatives with Belarusian and Russian citizens at this stage as it could involve traumatic process and even psychological violence, in the current context of large-scale hostilities, as it meets the Do No Harm criteria. However, they added that they are ready to create conditions for a future regional dialogue.

ACCOUNTABILITY

The strong war crimes monitoring infrastructure created by leading human rights organisations and centres in Ukraine has enabled the collection and verification of thousands of cases of serious violations committed by Russian troops. These actions have contributed to preventing the defencelessness of the Ukrainian population affected by the war and have empowered citizens to report on damage to physical infrastructure and abuses to the civilian population through physical or virtual means. So far, the three organisations and platforms created have transferred hundreds of cases with evidence and proof to international bodies, such as the International Criminal Court, and national bodies such as the Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office, com-

¹²⁵ See: https://peacefulchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Public_Statement_War_and_Dialogue_Ukraine_ENG.pdf

¹²⁶ Iryna Eihelson, Maksym Ielgulashvili, Tetiana Kalenychenko, Tetiana Kyselova. Kyiv, 2022, op. cit.

¹²⁷ Carl Plesner, Coordinator of Peace engineering School and Space for Dignity, interview with the author, online, April 25, 2022

¹²⁸ See: <https://khpg.org/en/1608808855>

¹²⁹ Charter 97. Refat Chubarov: *We Must End The War With The Return Of Crimea*. 16 May 2022.

<https://charter97.org/en/news/2022/5/16/467951/>

¹³⁰ See actions 36 and 38 of the database of nonviolent actions in Ukraine (Annex I).

¹³¹ Canan Kevser. *Law recognising Crimean Tatars as indigenous people comes into force in Ukraine*. Qirin News. July 24, 2021 <https://qirin.news/en/crimean-tatars/law-recognising-crimean-tatars-as-indigenous-people-comes-into-force-in-ukraine/>

¹³² Andre Kamenshikov, representative of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, interview with the author, Kyiv, 11 April 2022.

¹³³ Mariya Levonova [deputy director of the Centre of United Actions], interview with the author, Lviv, 15 April 2022.



Human chain in Slavutich to unload a humanitarian aid truck in Slavutich.
Source: Lorena Sopena

petent¹³⁴ in this matter, contributing to the first indictments for war crimes¹³⁵.

This area also involves challenges at several levels. First, strengthening transitional justice processes that would ensure more robust processes of truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation. One of the first challenges in this regard would be to also recognise the human rights violations committed by Ukrainian soldiers in the war¹³⁶, although the case of political persecution of Ruslan Kotsaba for denouncing human rights violations in the Donbass since 2014

does not augur that this process will be easy. Second, systematically disaggregating data on the aggressions carried out by non-state armed actors, including foreign fighters and members of military and private security companies such as the Russian Wagner Group¹³⁷.

¹³⁴ See: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61652467>

¹³⁵ Rachel Treisma. *Ukraine tries its first Russian soldier for alleged war crimes*. NPR. May 13, 2022. <https://www.npr.org/2022/05/11/1098242940/ukraine-russia-war-crimes-trial>

¹³⁶ Emmanuel Grynspan and Faustine Vincent. *Ukraine's military accused of war crimes against Russian troops*. Le Monde, 9 April 2022. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/04/09/ukraine-s-military-accused-of-war-crimes-against-russian-troop_5980121_4.html

¹³⁷ Lorenzo Tondo, Isobel Koshiw, Emma Graham-Harrison and Pjotr Sauer. *Alleged Wagner Group fighters accused of murdering civilians in Ukraine*. The Guardian. 25 May 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/25/wagner-group-fighters-accused-murdering-civilians-ukraine-war-crimes-belarus>

10 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUPPORTING NONVIOLENT CIVIL RESISTANCE

Recommendations for agencies, governments and international and Ukrainian civil society actors:

- 1. To strengthen nonviolent civil resistance in the zones under occupation:** through material and financial resources, the creation of spaces for coordination and information exchange, and the development of political-social advocacy actions to make visible and support the work of activists resisting the military occupation and the institutionalisation of repression in these territories.
- 2. To develop a system of protection of human rights defenders in accordance** with the guiding principles of the EU Human Rights Defenders in coordination with Ukrainian human rights defence centres and international organisations. This programme should pay special attention to the psychological impacts of war and the protection of activists in areas under temporary Russian military occupation.
- 3. To advance civilian war crimes monitoring and investigation systems** as mechanisms to ensure access to justice and the rule of law: through the human rights protection platforms created and incorporating a transitional justice perspective that includes the investigation of all war crimes and aggressions by non-state armed actors.
- 4. To strengthen community resilience and social cohesion through the organisations and infrastructure developed by the Ukrainian youth movement.** Concretely, this support should comprise a national capacity building program in conflict transformation, nonviolent action and digital resilience, as well as providing the Ukrainian youth center network with the skills and resources to develop nonviolent counter-narratives in cooperation with local and digital media.
- 5. To prevent social polarisation by supporting Ukraine's community mediation and dialogue facilitation interventions** to prevent intra-family and community conflicts between host and IDP communities from the east of the country.
- 6. To encourage the development of nonviolent initiatives, dialogue and peacebuilding at regional level through financial support and the creation of spaces for the exchange of information and planning of actions** with activists and groups committed to social justice and human rights, taking advantage of the relationships, capacities and experiences of organisations specialising in these geographical and thematic areas to find common objectives.
- 7. To influence the design of new global and regional architectures based on human security** that place protection and human needs at the centre, involve the design of nonviolent strategies to transform conflicts and redirect resources away from militaristic structures and initiatives. This work must take into account the extensive work developed by the United Nations in the field of human security.
- 8. To explore the possibility of regulating and developing a nonviolent civilian defence system¹³⁸** that builds on existing experiences such as the Lithuanian National Defence Strategy¹³⁹. This process should include a public debate on the limits of nonviolence and complementarity with military defence.

¹³⁸ According to Professor Bartkowski: "Nonviolent civil defence is based on the fact that the entire population, including its institutions and networks, are part of the resistance force. This force wages a daily war of total non-cooperation with the aggressor in all areas of social, political, economic and cultural life. This opposition makes any invasion or, subsequently, occupation unsustainable in the long term" (2015). For more information see Gene Sharp's work *Civilian-based defence. A post-military weapons system* [1990].

¹³⁹ For more information on Lithuania's civil defence strategy see: <https://kam.lt/en/civil-resilience/>

9. To protect and regulate conscientious objection as a human right of citizens to contribute to the defence of their country without the use of arms. This should include the protection of the civil and political rights of peace activists and conscientious objectors.

10. To ensure that social and political reconstruction builds on the development of local governance and political decentralisation, and guarantees the effective participation in decision-making processes of women's organisations and activists who are leading the country's nonviolent civil resistance, human rights advocacy and the promotion of mediation and dialogue facilitation.

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ANNEX

Database of Nonviolent Actions in Ukraine (24 February - 30 June 2022)

N°	Description	Type of NV	Subcategory	Specific action	Location	Region	Date	Link
1	In Genichesk a woman approached an armed Russian soldier and demand him to leave her hometown	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.1. Psychological interventions	033. Fraternalization	Henichesk	South	24/02/2022	https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/u-genichesku-zhin-ka-proganyala-rosiyskih-soldativ-50219744.html ; https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-henichesk-woman-confronts-russian/31723523.html
2	Toronto TV covers the war from a humoristic perspective to confront fear and keep morale high	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	011. Records, radio, TV	Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	West	24/02/2022	https://www.instagram.com/toronto_tv/
3	In Bakhmach a group of civilians blocked the road to prevent Russian tanks from advancing towards Kiev	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Bakhmach	north	26/02/2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nu9ejPdVbC0
4	Two locals removed a Russian flag in Chaplynka	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of flags and symbols	Chaplynka, Kherson oblast	South	26/02/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8474 https://novakahovka.city/articles/196417/u-chaplynci-skinuli-rosijskij-prapor
5	A man took a mine from under a bridge with his bare hands and carried it to the forest	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Berdiansk	South	27/02/2022	https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/cholovik-golimi-rukami-perenis-minu-do-lisoposadki-video-novini-ukrajini-50220613.html
6	A group of locals from the Dobrianka village gathered on the Ukraine-Belarus border to sing the national hymn and let the Belorussian and Russian soldiers know that they are not welcome in Ukraine.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	028. symbolic sounds	Dobrianka	North	28/02/2022	https://t.me/suspilnechernihiv/6440
7	Ukrainian flags are displayed in the central streets of Kherson	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	28/02/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8588
8	Locals disguised a signpost near the village of Stara Sburjiwka	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	172. Nonviolent obstruction	Stara Sburjiwka, Kherson oblast	South	28/02/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8595
9	In Berdyansk, a town in the south-east of Ukraine temporarily occupied by the Russian forces, dozens of people went out to protest on the streets filled with the Russian military.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdiansk	South	28/02/2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3G97bBTCy50
10	Ukrainians citizens block the movement of Russian military convoy towards Chernihiv. People blocked the road and occupiers turned around and drove towards Senkivka.	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Horodnia, Chernihiv oblast	North	28/02/2022	https://t.me/suspilnechernihiv/6407
11	Local residents block Russian tanks in Chernihiv region	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Koryukivka	North	28/02/2022	https://mamedia24.com/russian-soldiers-asked-the-way-to-go-to-kyiv-then-the-citizens-of-ukraine-stood-in-front-of-the-tanks/
12	Road workers post road signs "banning" Putin	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	172. Nonviolent obstruction	Unknow	North	28/02/2022	https://www.facebook.com/Ukravtodor.Gov.Ua/posts/pfbid02gG3RjrPcPPLfMsFh2v7xZxtVoZL4aKRARJcwBH-btvqjgBaKEg1A2kg7X3Ffjb1AI
13	A woman in a car with a child and an elderly woman refused to give her passport to an armed Russian soldier who blocked an entry to her hometown in the north-eastern Ukraine.	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Zhytnia, Sumskia oblast	North	28/02/2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qG5o6dj8KEo

14	Local residents in Sumy oblast develop a communication system to find safe routes to move in the occupied region and access Sumy city, under siege, with food, medicines and other supplies	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.3. Social intervention	180. Alternative communication system	Sumy, Sumy-ka oblast	North	28/02/2022	Interview on 7/4/2022 with NGO community of Sumy
15	Ukrainian citizens block Russian convoy with their bodies and shouting "occupants" and "go home"	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent intersection	Melitopol	South	01/03/2022	https://www.nbcnews.com/video/civilians-resist-military-convoy-in-melitopol-ukraine-134398533724
16	Tsukr media cover stories from ordinary people to keep morale high	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	011. Records, radio, TV	Sumy, Sumy-ka oblast	north	01/03/2022	https://cukr.city/
17	Locals disguised a signpost near Kahovka	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	172. Nonviolent obstruction	Kahovka, Kherson oblast	South	01/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8651
18	Euromaidan SOS a decentralized information hub to support on protection/evacuation, shelter and other needs from the community is activated	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.3. Social intervention	Expressive Tactics Using Medium of Electronic Communication - Crowdsourcing information	Kyiv	North	01/03/2022	
19	In Berdyansk, the flagpole mount was broken. City residents came out to fix it	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	01/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnezaporizhzhya/2767
20	The organisation Center for Women Perspectives provides psychological support to women IDPs and their families in Lviv Oblasts	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.3. Social intervention	Protection, women	Lviv	West	01/03/2022	https://russiancrime.org/main-page
21	A crowd of people build barricade and block the road to prevent Russian soldiers to access the Nuclear plant of Energodar	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent intersection	Enerhodar	South	02/03/2022	https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=256341830021658
22	Multiple actions in Kherson: Solitary pickets in different parts of occupied Kherson, man waving flags on the main street, people trying to take away the Ukrainian flag from Russian military, people arguing with military	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kershon	South	02/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8731 // https://novynar-nia.com/2022/03/02/heron-svoboda/ // https://t.me/LastBP/5177
23	Concentration of local residents to protest against Russian invasion of Vodiane. Protesters were dispersed by Russian military using flash grenades. At least one person injured	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	"Vodiane, Zaporizhzhia Oblast"	South	02/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnezaporizhzhya/2827 https://suspilne.media/213107-poblizu-energodara-vid-granati-okupantiv-postrazdali-dvoe-mirimih-meshkanciv/
24	"Massive protest against invasion in Melitopol. Russian military opened fire on protesters. One person injured"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	02/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnezaporizhzhya/2828 https://t.me/u_now/22226
25	Protest in Kahovka. People carried a large Ukrainian flag. Russian military dispersed protest firing with rubber bullets. Two protesters were injured, seven kidnapped by Russian military	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kahovka, Kherson oblast	South	03/04/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/10295 https://t.me/suspilnekherson/10214 https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/04/03/meshkanci-kahovki-znovu-vijshli-na-miting-%d1%97x-rozanyayut-video/
26	Ukrainians in Melitopol protest against the Russian occupation. People carried lots of Ukrainian symbols and marched through the streets	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Melitopol	South	04/03/2022	https://t.me/nvua_official/20265
27	Demonstration in Markivka in Luhansk region against the Russian army. Protest started with a solidarity picketing	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Markivka	East	04/03/2022	https://suspilne.media/214023-ziteli-bilokurakinogo-ta-markivki-vijsli-na-mitingi-proti-okupacii/ https://www.facebook.com/100001443234836/videos/1603879019977408/ https://www.facebook.com/gazeta.markovka https://dn.depo.ua/ukr/severodonetsk-na-luganshchini-meshkantsi-okupovanoi-markivki-vdruge-vyshli-na-proukrainskiy-miting-202203051431662
28	"Protest in Kherson. People refuse publically Russian humanitarian aid"	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Kherson	South	04/03/2022	https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3420253-u-centri-hersona-vijsli-na-akciu-protestu-proti-agresora.html

29	Civilians offered tea/food and called the mother of one Russian soldier that was captured by Ukrainian army	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.1. Psychological interventions	033. Fraternization	Novyi Buh, Mykolaiv Oblast	South	04/03/2022	https://www.facebook.com/groups/noviybug/posts/2633475466795920/ ; https://www.firstpost.com/world/locals-in-ukraine-give-food-to-russian-soldier-help-him-video-call-his-mother-watch-video-here-10429641.html ; https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1499060828817043474?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetem-bed%7Ctwterm%5E1499060828817043474%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.firstpost.com%2Fworld%2Flocals-in-ukraine-give-food-to-russian-soldier-help-him-video-call-his-mother-watch-video-here-10429641.html
30	Demonstration in Bilokurakyn in Luhansk region against the Russian army. A crowd of civilians stood opposite the Russian military. The protesters called on the Russian occupiers to leave Ukraine.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Bilokurakyn	East	05/03/2022	https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCN7ytln9W-WuPccGft0jLSQ/videos ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=6404230338568756&ref=sharing
31	Local musician played the anthem on a trumpet in the center of occupied Kherson	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	028. symbolic sounds	Kherson	South	05/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8868
32	Protest against Russian occupation in Berdyansk. Protesters refused "humanitarian aid" from Russian army and organised their own humanitarian aid	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	05/03/2022	https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3421036-u-berdansk-na-mitingu-proti-rosijskih-zagarnikov-skanduit-ukraina-ponad-use.html https://censor.net/ua/news/3321826/ne_nado_nas_kormyt_hvatyt_ubyvat_berdyansk_protestuye_proty_oku-pantiv_ta_masovo_vidmovlyayetsya_vid
33	Massive demonstration against Russian occupation of Melitopol. Demonstrators burned effigy of Putin	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	06/03/2022	https://suspilne.media/214579-neskorenij-melitopol-mistani-znovu-vijsli-na-miting-proti-okupacijnih-vijsk-rf/
34	Massive demonstration in Kakhovka, despite the fact that there was no phone connection in the city. People carried large flag	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	06/03/2022	https://vgoru.org/post/hersonshina-doluchayetsya-do-mirnoyi-akcii-video https://t.me/vgorunews/1925 https://t.me/vgorunews/1936
35	Massive demonstration in Nova Kakhovka. Russian military began firing on protesters. One person was killed and seven were injured	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Nova Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	06/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/1936 https://t.me/suspilnenews/7235 https://t.me/Pravda_Gerashchenko/2200 https://www.facebook.com/pho.gov.ua/posts/323389396489795
36	Massive demonstration in Henichensk. Besides Ukrainian flags, people brought the Crimean Tatar flag to protest	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Henichesk, Kherson oblast	South	06/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8889 https://t.me/vgorunews/1911
37	Massive demonstration in Kalanchak. People carried a large Ukrainian flag	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kalanchak, Kherson oblast	South	06/03/2022	https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=7947839281440986&id=100028374940771 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3421894-u-timcasovo-okupovanih-genicesku-kahovci-ta-kalancaku-masovi-proukrainski-mitingi.html
38	Protest against the occupation of Crimea near the Crimean checkpoint "Chongar" in Novooleksiivka. People brought Crimean Tatar flags to protest	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Novooleksiivka, Kherson oblast	South	06/03/2022	https://twitter.com/ua_industrial/status/1500452078677905410?s=20&t=zQIP9_HX-HkFT3DQP7zklAQ https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-crimea/3422198-ziteli-sela-congar-vijsli-na-miting-proti-zagarnikov-z-vimogou-zabirati-sa-z-krimu.html
39	Concentration and march of local residents of Tavriisk with flags and Ukrainian symbols	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Tavriisk, Kherson oblast	South	06/03/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/07/ziteli-tavrijska-vijsli-na-masshtabnij-miting-proti-rosijskix-vijskovix-foto/
40	Protest against Russian occupation in Berdyansk. People marched through the streets, sang ukrainian songs and shouted "Berdyansk is Ukraine"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	06/03/2022	https://t.me/Pravda_Gerashchenko/2264

41	Protest against Russian occupation in Mykhailivka. Russian military fired in the air	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Mykhailivka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	06/03/2022	https://subbota.ua/news/171635/bezzbrojni-mesh-kanczi-mihajlivki-vijshli-na-miting-okupanti-strilyali-video
42	The civil network OPORA launch an online system to register war crimes in a secured manner. The system is supported with a legal team who analysed and follow-up the cases for potential prosecution of the aggressors.	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.3. Social intervention	Human rights, protection, crowdsourcing information	Lviv, Chernivtsi, Kyiv	North-West	15/03/2022	https://russiancrime.org/main-page
43	Local residents from Lviv build anti-tank obstacles against Russian invasion	3. Nonviolent Intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	172. Nonviolent obstruction	Lviv	West	07/03/2022	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4AagtlG_D2Y
44	Protest against Russian occupation in Melitopol. People sang Ukrainian hymn	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	07/03/2022	https://zp.depo.ua/ukr/zp/u-mistakh-zaporizkoi-oblasti-lyudi-mitinguyut-proti-rosiyskikh-okupantiv-foto-video-202203061432039
45	Protest against Russian occupation in Berdyansk. People refused "humanitarian aid" from the hands of the Russian army and sang Ukrainian hymn instead	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	07/03/2022	https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/03/7/7329256/ https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/society/berdyansk-tse-ukraina-zhiteli-mista-bezstrashno-vistupili-proti-rosiyskikh-okupantiv-foto-i-video.htm
46	Massive demonstration in Novotroitske. People carried a large Ukrainian flag	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Novotroitske, Kherson oblast	South	07/03/2022	https://t.me/trudovaslavant/60 https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8932 https://24tv.ua/heronshhini-znovu-masshtabni-mitingi-proti-okupatsiyi_n1894604
47	Protest in Kakhovka. People carried a large Ukrainian flag	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	07/03/2022	https://www.facebook.com/ulia.solomahina/posts/5274358309282307
48	Massive demonstration in Chaplynka. Some protesters put Ukrainian flags on Russian armored vehicle and pissed on the wheels. Russian military blocked the road to stop protesters and began to fire in the air. Yet two protesters were injured.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Chaplynka, Kherson oblast	South	07/03/2022	https://t.me/operativnoZSU/11877 https://t.me/Pravda_Gerashchenko/2473 https://t.me/operativnoZSU/11845
49	Massive demonstration in Nova Kakhovka. People carried large Ukrainian flag and sent another flag into the air on balloons	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Nova Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	07/03/2022	https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/632
50	Protest in Velyka Lepetykha	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Velyka Lepetykha, Kherson oblast	South	07/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8964
51	Protest in Skadovsk. People carried a large Ukrainian flag	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Skadovsk, Kherson oblast	South	07/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/8947
52	Unarmed civilians from Kherson confront Russian soldiers. Soldiers fire into the air	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	07/03/2022	https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1578086/Ukraine-war-Kherson-video-Russia-invasion-Russian-army-protest-vn ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=933011774041233
53	Concentrations of local residents in Kherson with flags in public spaces	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	07/03/2022	" https://suspilne.media/214714-na-herson-sini-do-mirnoi-akcii-proti-okupantiv-doednuut-sa-vse-bilse-naselenih-punktiv/ https://www.unian.ua/war/zhiteli-hersona-viyshli-na-akciyu-protestu-proti-rosiyskikh-okupantiv-vid-eo-novini-vtorgnennyya-rosiji-v-ukrajinu-11732647.html "
54	Protest against Russian occupation in Tokmak. Protesters shouted "Go home" and "Tokmak is Ukraine" in front of the Russian military	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	07/03/2022	http://1news.zp.ua/ru/v-okkupirovannom-tokmake-neskolko-tysyach-chelovek-vyshli-na-miting-protiv-rossiyskikh-okkupantov-video/

55	Protest in Oleshky. People carried a large Ukrainian flag	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Oleshky, Kherson oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2023 https://t.me/sus-pilnekherson/8997 https://apostrophe.ua/ua/news/society/2022-03-08/ukrainskiy-narod-ne-boitsya-ok-kupanta-pod-hersonom-jiteli-vyishli-na-massovyiy-patrioticheskiy-miting-video/261818
56	Protest in Beryslav. Protesters laid flowers at the pedestal with the state flag.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	047. Assemblies of protest or support	Beryslav, Kherson oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://t.me/sus-pilnekherson/8999 https://pivden-nukraine.com.ua/2022/03/08/v-berislavi-vidbu-vsya-proukra%D1%97nskij-miting-foto/
57	Protest in Nyzhni Sirohozy.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Nyzhni Sirohozy, Kherson oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/08/v-nizhnix-sirogozax-proxodit-proukra%D1%97nskij-miting-foto/ https://t.me/sus-pilnekherson/9002
58	"Massive protest in Hola Prystan. People carried a large Ukrainian flag. Protest was also dedicated to women"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Hola Prystan, Kherson oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2060 https://t.me/sus-pilnekherson/9014 https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/08/v-golij-pristani-rozgornuli-velicheznij-prapor-ukra%D1%97ni-foto/
59	Protest in Berezhanka where activists burned effigy of Putin in a coffin	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berezhanka, Kherson oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://t.me/sus-pilnekherson/9010
60	March of local residents with Ukrainian flags and banners in Syvaske.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Syvaske, Kherson oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://t.me/sus-pilnekherson/9005
61	Protest in Chervona Polyana. Residents of the villages of Chervona Polyana and Novyi Hai gathered to protest. People carried a large Ukrainian flag.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Chervona Polyana, Kherson oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://t.me/sus-pilnekherson/9003
62	Small gathering protesting against the occupation of Kherson.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	08/03/2022	https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/03/8/7329433/
63	Protest against Russian occupation in Berdyansk. Protesters shouted "Shame" "Go Home" to a convoy of Russian troops passing by	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://hvylya.net/news/248591-v-berdyan-ske-vyhodyat-na-mitingi-protiv-rossii-ukraincy-rasskazali-o-situacii-v-gorode https://sus-pilne.media/215238-u-tokmaku-ta-berdiansku-vidbulis-mitingi-za-ukrainu-ta-proti-okupacii-rosijskimi-vijskami/
64	Protest against Russian occupation in Tokmak. Protesters shouted "Tokmak is Ukraine" in front of the Russian military	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://sus-pilne.media/215238-u-tokmaku-ta-berdiansku-vidbulis-mitingi-za-ukrainu-ta-proti-okupacii-rosijskimi-vijskami/
65	Protest against Russian occupation in Melitopol. When a column of Russian vehicles passed through the street, protesters shouted "Shame!"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	08/03/2022	https://zp.depo.ua/ukr/zp/zhiteli-melitopolya-vch-ergove-viyshli-na-miting-nezvazhayuchi-na-pogrozi-okupantiv-202203081432607 https://sus-pilne.media/215321-u-melitopoli-mistani-vihodat-na-mitingi-popri-pogrozi-vijskovih-rf-zastosuvati-so-do-nih-zbrou/
66	March of locals residents in Energodar including a symbolic action to honor the memory of the great Kobzar and laid flowers at the monument of the national poet Taras Shevchenko.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	047. Assemblies of protest or support	Energodar, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	09/03/2022	https://t.me/orlovdmityroEn/235 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-culture/3424637-v-energodari-vsanuvalli-kobzara.html
67	Protest against Russian occupation in Berdyansk. Protesters shouted "Go home!"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	09/03/2022	https://censor.net/ua/video_news/3323259/domoyi_poka_jyvoyi_mityng_prot_y_rosiyskyh_okupantiv_prohodyt_u_berdyansku_video
68	Protest against Russian occupation in Melitopol. People sang Ukrainian hymn and prayer for Ukraine	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	028. symbolic sounds	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	09/03/2022	https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3424706-tisaci-melitopolciv-znovu-vijsli-na-miting-proti-okupacii-mista.html

69	Demonstration in Skadovsk dedicated to the 208th anniversary of the birth of Taras Shevchenko. Russian military invaded in Skadovsk to occupy city administration and to announce a ban on holding protests. Russian military sprayed the protesters with a can of unknown substance	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Skadovsk, Kherson oblast	South	09/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2130 https://t.me/suspilnek-herson/9068 https://t.me/suspilnekherson/9071
70	Protest in the village of Antonivka. A column of protesters from Antonivka organised a march to Skadovsk in support of protesters there	1. Protest and disuasion	1.7 Processions	038. Marches	Antonivka, Kherson oblast	South	09/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2133 https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/09/zhiteli-selishha-antonivka-skadovskogo-rajonu-provodyat-miting-na-pidtrimku-ukra%D1%97ni-foto/
71	March of locals residents in Kherson including a symbolic action to honor the memory of the great Kobzar and laid flowers at the monument of the national poet Taras Shevchenko.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	09/03/2022	https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/proishodit-herson-seychas-situatsiya-gorode-1646352716.html // https://www.facebook.com/khersoncouncil/posts/267884708862519 // https://suspilne.media/225081-u-hersoni-volontieri-stvorili-bank-odagu-ta-zbiraut-produktovi-nabori-dla-ludej-z-invalidnistu/
72	Locals in occupied Horodnia held a rally to commemorate the poet Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Horodnia, Chernihiv oblast	North	09/03/2022	https://suspilne.media/215529-v-zajnatij-rosijskimi-okupantami-gorodni-proveli-miting-do-dna-narodzenna-sevcenka/
73	Protests in Kherson. People commemorated the attack of the aggressor on the maternity hospital in Mariupol	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	10/03/2022	https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3425723-hersonci-na-akcii-protestu-nazvali-rosijskih-agresoriv-ditovbivcami.html
74	Over 1500 people went to protest in Melitopol against Russian occupation. The participants of the protest approached the building of the Security Service of Ukraine, which was occupied by the occupiers. A column was installed in front of the building and an appeal to Russian soldiers was turned on, informing about the crimes of the Russian army against the civilian population of Ukraine. Then people threw paper planes at the building	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	047. Assemblies of protest or support	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	10/03/2022	https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/10/7330126/ https://www.061.ua/news/3347582/v-melitopoli-na-mitingu-proti-okupacii-zaavili-pro-peresliduvanna-ta-zvernulis-do-rosijskih-zagarnikov
75	A municipal guard formed in Enerhodar. Residents of the city will join in ensuring order in the city during curfew to prevent cases of looting, law and order violations	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.5. Political intervention	198. Parallel gov'	Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	10/03/2022	https://t.me/onenews_zp/27269
76	Protests in Kherson. Russian military began firing into the air	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	11/03/2022	https://t.me/Pravda_Gerashchenko/3472 // https://censor.net/ua/video_news/3323936/herson_tse_ukrayina_meshkantsi_okupovanogo_mista_vyishly_na_mityng_okupanty_strilyayut_u_povitrya_video
77	Voluntary night patrols have started working in the community of Hola Prystan	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.5. Political intervention	198. Parallel gov'	Hola Prystan, Kherson oblast	South	11/03/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/11/u-golo-pristanskij-gromadi-sformuvani-patruli-nichnogo-cher-guvannya/
78	Protest against occupation in Prymorsk. People sang Ukrainian anthem.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	028. symbolic sounds	Prymorsk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	12/03/2022	https://t.me/onenews_zp/27508
79	Protests against occupation in Berdyansk. People shouted "Russia go home"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	12/03/2022	https://t.me/onenews_zp/27531
80	Demonstrations in Melitopol after city's mayor kidnapping by Russian forces.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Melitopol	South	12/03/2022	https://news.sky.com/video/ukraine-war-melitopol-residents-protest-after-russian-forces-abduct-mayor-12564025
81	Small concentration and march of local residents holding flags, flowers and banners stating "Kherson is Ukraine".	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	12/03/2022	https://suspilne.media/216784-mi-ukrainci-a-ne-kapyski-rabi-hersonci-znovu-vijsli-na-mirnij-miting/

82	Massive demonstrations in occupied Kherson during the commemoration of the liberation of the city from the Nazi occupation. Hundreds of citizens gather at public spaces with Ukrainian flags and shouting "Kershon is Ukraine" against the Russian invasion. Unsuccessful attempt to disperse protesters as well as single pickets in support of the occupation	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kershon	South	13/03/2022	"https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/03/13/7330971/ https://apostrophe.ua/ua/news/society/accidents/2022-03-13/herson--eto-ukraina-v-zah-vachennom-hersone-sotni-ukraintsev-vyshli-na-novy-iy-miting-foto-i-video/262406 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3428506-u-hersoni-na-prorosijskij-miting-zi-brali-hersonskih-politichnih-marginaliv-socmerezi.html "
83	Protest in Nova Kakhovka. People gathered near previously unseen banner "Ukrainians will win!".	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Nova Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	13/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2297 https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/14/novokaxovchani-vijshli-na-miting-proti-stvorenniya-xnr/
84	Colourful demonstration in Hola Prystan with Ukrainian flags	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Hola Prystan, Kherson oblast	South	13/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2442 https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/v-goliy-pristani-zaspivali-gimn-novini-ukrajini-50224781.html https://www.facebook.com/groups/golapristan/posts/5011534255629985/
85	Concentration of local residents in Kakhovka	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	13/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2460 https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1503015103247040519
86	Peaceful march in Velyka Oleksandrivka against the Russian invasion	1. Protest and disuasion	1.7 Processions	038. Marches	"Velyka Oleksandrivka, Kherson oblast"	South	13/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2459 https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/14/u-velikij-oleksandrivci-vidbuv-sya-proukra%01%97nskij-miting-video/
87	Large protest against occupation in Berdyansk. Protesters around the city and shouted "Berdyansk is Ukraine"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	13/03/2022	https://t.me/onenews_zp/27618
88	Protest against occupation in Tokmak. Protesters brought placards "Tokmak Ukraine"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	13/03/2022	https://t.me/onenews_zp/27651
89	Over 1000 people went to protests in Melitopol. Melitopol residents demanded that the occupiers report where they had abducted Mayor Fedorov and activist Haisumova. Russian military warned through a loudspeaker about the ban of public gatherings. "Galyu go away!" protesters shouted over the appointment of Galina Danilchenko "mayor" of occupied Melitopol	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	13/03/2022	https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-melitopol-mitynh-na-pidtrymku-mera/31750627.html https://t.me/riamelitopol/46464
90	Citizens in Odessa build wall of sandbags against a potential invasion through their beach	3. Nonviolent Intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	172. Nonviolent obstruction	Odessa	South	14/03/2022	https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sandbags-songs-odessa-beach-ukrainians-help-build-defences-2022-03-14/
91	In Melitopol armed occupiers blocked a peaceful demonstration and took away Ukrainian symbols. Two people were abducted	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	14/03/2022	https://t.me/onenews_zp/27752 https://hromadske.radio/news/2022/03/14/viys-ka-rf-ne-daly-provesty-shchodennyy-mitynh-proty-rosijskoi-okupatsii-v-melitopoli
92	A column of protesters marched in Prymorsk shouting "Prymorsk is Ukraine", "Melitopol we stand with you" "Mariupol we stand with you"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Prymorsk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	14/03/2022	https://t.me/onenews_zp/27769?single
93	A column of protesters in Berdyansk marched with Ukrainian flags and shouted "Here the owner is Ukrainian - remember, a foreigner"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	14/03/2022	https://t.me/onenews_zp/27783
94	Protest in Bilozerka. Protesters blocked the movement of Russian military vehicles. Russian military fired in the air to disperse protest.	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent intersection	Bilozerka, Kherson oblast	South	14/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/9303 https://t.me/suspilnekherson/9305 https://t.me/hueviykherson/13848 https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/14/u-bilozerci-miscevi-zhiteli-perekryli-rux-vorozho%01%97-texniki-rosijski-vijskovi-pochali-strilyati-video/

95	Locals from Ulianiivka village gathered to block the movement of Russian military vehicles.	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent intervention	Ulianiivka, Kherson oblast	South	14/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2483 https://www.facebook.com/katarina.krivorog/videos/352633343480201
96	New protest in Kherson. Local residents hold banners and flags.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	14/03/2022	https://www.facebook.com/vgoru/posts/4959888727411397
97	The Coalition SAM composed by 16 human rights organisations and devoted to monitor and prosecute War Crimes is launched	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.3. Social intervention	Human rights, protection, Sousveillance:	Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, etc	Nation-wide	15/03/2022	https://www.5am.in.ua/en
98	Protest in Zaliznyi Port. Locals residents sing Ukrainian anthem.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	028. symbolic sounds	Zaliznyi Port, Kherson oblast	South	15/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/9365
99	Demonstration in front of the municipality of Kherson. Citizens hold Ukrainian flags.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	15/03/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/15/xersonci-shhodnya-vixodyat-na-centralnu-plosh-hu-na-proukra%D1%97nskiy-miting-foto/
100	City mayor Ihor Kolyhaev published inspiring video with words of support for Ukraine	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	011. Records, radio, TV	Kherson	South	15/03/2022	https://suspilne.media/217616-miskij-golova-hersona-zaklikav-hersonciv-obednatis/
101	Protesters in Melitopol decided to change the location and purpose of the protest and gathered near the local cemetery to lay flowers to soldiers who fought for the liberation of the city from German occupation during World War II. However, the protesters were dispersed with light and noise grenades and 9 people were abducted	1. Protest and disuasion	1.8. Honouring the dead	046. Homage at burial places	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	15/03/2022	https://ria-m.tv/news/280416/v_melitopole_na_mitinge_okkupanty_primenili_svetovumovuyu_gratatu_i_snova_vyikrali_lyudey.html
102	A joint prayer for Ukraine took place at the local market in Hornostaivka	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	020. Prayer and worships	Hornostaivka, Kherson oblast	South	15/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/9364
103	Volunteers from the "Municipal Guard" utility company monitor law and order in Kherson throughout the day as the city's law enforcement agencies are not working	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.5. Political intervention	198. Parallel gov'	Kherson	South	15/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2566
104	Kherson agrarians from the village of Chulakivka led a column of agricultural machinery to spring field work under Ukrainian flags.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Chulakivka, Kherson oblast	South	15/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2550
105	The local community of Podolianochka implemented a communication system to identify saboteurs in their neighbourhood	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.5. Political intervention	194. Disclosing identities of secret agents	Kyiv	North	15/03/2022	Interview conducted on 6/4/22 to Podolianochka's organisers in Kyiv
106	Large column of protesters in Berdyansk marched with large Ukrainian flag	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	16/03/2022	https://t.me/ZapoLife/2147 https://t.me/suspilne-zaporizhzhya/3158
107	New protest in Kherson. Local residents hold banners and flags.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	16/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/9410?single
108	Protest in Skadovsk due to the kidnapping by the occupiers of the mayor. The Russian military threw tear gas grenades and fired to disperse protesters. The mayor was released immediately after the protests	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Skasovsk, Kherson oblast	South	16/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/9400 https://t.me/vgorunews/2606
109	New protest in Kherson. Local residents hold banners and flags.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	17/03/2022	https://www.facebook.com/vgoru/posts/4968331109900492
110	"Local resident in occupied Scadovsk remove the Russian flag from the city council Ukrainian flag was hung on a monument to Russian General Potemkin"	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of flags and symbols	Kherson	South	17/03/2022	https://www.facebook.com/vgoru/posts/4968158819917721
111	Local resident in occupied Scadovsk remove the Russian flag from the city council	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Skadovsk, Kherson oblast	South	17/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/9468

112	Billboard with the inscription "Kherson, hold on! We are with you! Kharkiv" were installed in Kharkiv	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Kharkiv	East	17/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2663
113	In the village of Komyshi locals burned humanitarian aid rations from Russian soldiers	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Komyshany, Kherson oblast	South	18/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2786
114	Residents of Brylivka village gathered to protest and sing Ukrainian folk song in front of Russian soldiers. Russian military tried to hand over humanitarian aid, but the locals refused	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Brylivka, Kherson oblast	South	18/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2736 https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/society/na-hersonschini-lyudi-vijshli-na-miting-proti-okupantiv-ta-skanduyut-patriotichni-gas-la-video.htm
115	Symbolic initiative in Lviv, 109 empty prams on Rynok Square symbolize 109 kids have been killed by Russians since the day one of full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	029. Symbolic reclamation	Rynok Square, Lviv	West	18/03/2022	https://t.me/andriysadovyi/647 ; https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=5362638611950556-set=a.280629350091842
116	Protest of local residents from Kherson. Children and adults hold Ukrainian flags.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	18/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2762?single
117	Protest in Kherson. Local residents hold banners and flags.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	19/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2898 // https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3434249-u-hersoni-trivaut-akcii-protestu-proti-rosijskogo-agresora.html
118	Massive demonstration in Kherson. Protesters block Russian military vehicle	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Kherson	South	20/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/2958 https://novynarnia.com/2022/03/20/goliruch-vidtisnyayut-tehniku-mista-pivdnya-ukrayiny-znovu-vyjsly-na-protest-proti-okupantiv-video/
119	Local residents block Russian convoy and force them to turn around	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Kherson	South	20/03/2022	https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-kherson-residents-tell-russian-forces-to-go-home-as-they-confront-military-vehicles-12571479 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zSEN2Upa6aw
120	Concentration of local residents to protest against the occupation in Kakhovka	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	20/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/9620
121	Protests against occupation in Berdyansk. Russian military began to disperse protesters firing in the air and abducted about 10 people	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	20/03/2022	https://suspilne.media/219623-na-tradicijnomu-mirnomu-mitingu-v-berdiansku-bulo-cutno-postrili/ https://t.me/onenews_zp/28504
122	Protesters in Enerhodar went to the city councils to disagree with the abduction of Ukrainian citizens and their captivity. In particular, the protesters demanded the release of First Deputy Mayor Ivan Samoidyuk. The Russian occupiers tried to detain several protesters, but hundreds blocked the exit of the Russian military's car and prevented the military from taking the protesters.	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	20/03/2022	https://t.me/suspilnezaporizhzhya/3253 https://t.me/suspilnezaporizhzhya/3251 https://t.me/onenews_zp/28513 https://t.me/onenews_zp/28509
123	"Protests in Kherson. The Russian military fired gas and light-noise grenades at people. One person was injured, one person was detained. The fire was opened after some protesters had erased inscription ""ZSU killers"" on the monument dedicated to the heroes of the Revolution of Dignity "	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	21/03/2022	https://t.me/jurnko/2524 https://most.ks.ua/news/type/1/url/u_hersoni_okupanti_rozignali_proukrajinskij_miting_je_poraneni https://suspilne.media/219938-u-hersoni-v-ludej-aki-vijsli-na-mirnij-miting-strilali-rosijski-vijskovi/ https://t.me/vgorunews/3032

124	In Ukraine, all nuclear power plants held peaceful demonstrations in support of Enerhodar and Zaporozhye NPP. People took to the streets with Ukrainian flags and posters: "Energodar, we are proud of you", "ZNPP, Ukraine with you", "We will stand! We will win "; " We pray for you and others "	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Varash [Rivne Nuclear Power Plant], Yu-zhnoukrainsk [South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant], Netishyn [Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant]	West/South	21/03/2022	http://1news.zp.ua/ru/v-ukraine-vse-atomnye-el-ektrostanczii-proveli-akczii-v-podderzhku-energodara-i-zaporozhskoj-aes-foto-video/ https://www.061.ua/news/3354861/u-mistah-suput-nikah-aes-prohodat-akcii-na-pidtrimku-okupovano-go-energodaru
125	Protest against occupation in Prymorsk. People sang songs, marching through the streets and held placards "Prymorsk is Ukraine"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Prymorsk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	21/03/2022	https://t.me/onenews_zp/28614
126	Protests in Kherson. The Russian military began throwing tear gas grenades to disperse protesters. Afterwards, some protesters returned to the square	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	22/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/3099 https://susilne.media/220316-u-hersoni-rosijski-vijskovi-rozignali-mirnij-miting-granatami-zi-slozognim-gazom/
127	Boycott action against multinational company Philips to stop their operations and investment in Russia due to their aggression to Ukraine	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic Non-cooperation	071. Consumer's boycott	Lviv	West	22/03/2022	Interview with Mykola davydiuk on May 2th 2022. Videos of actions: https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1xgGmyB4euX9p8bD7esznQnfzqD-nzGAE
128	Small gathering of protestors after days of demonstrations and brutal repression by Russian army	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	23/03/2022	https://t.me/vgorunews/3150
129	Local activists made a map with the location of Russian troops in Kherson. The map shows checkpoints with the Russian military and other locations.	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.3. Social intervention	180. Alternative communication system	Kherson	South	23/05/2022	https://t.me/svidomi_ua/19079 https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?ll=46.67017833028436%2C32.62929833248872&z=14&mid=1J3J9lase66D7gr1MK_SD0-hqy0WQlqv9n
130	In Chornobaivka locals refused to take humanitarian aid from the Russian military and burned it	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Chornobaivka, Kherson oblast	South	23/03/2022	https://t.me/truexanewsua/35938
131	In Enerhodar unknown people toppled a flagpole on which the occupiers hung a flag with communist symbolics and burned it	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	23/03/2022	https://t.me/susilnezaporizhzhya/3321
132	The flag of Ukraine was raised again in the city council of Kherson	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	24/03/2022	https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/24/7334147/ https://www.facebook.com/kolykhaev.igor/posts/5056996771060383
133	The majority of deputies of the Enerhodar City Council resigned. Deputies are worried that their votes could be used under duress - to create illegal "people's republics" in the territory of Enerhodar under the rule of Russian occupiers	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	145. General administrative non-cooperation	Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	24/03/2022	https://susilne.media/221208-bilsist-deputativ-energodarskoi-miskradi-sklali-povnovazenna-miskij-golova/
134	Boycott action against multinational company Nestle to stop their operations and investment in Russia due to their aggression to Ukraine	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic Non-cooperation	071. Consumer's boycott	Lviv	West	24/03/2022	Interview with Mykola davydiuk on May 2th 2022. Videos of actions: https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1xgGmyB4euX9p8bD7esznQnfzqD-nzGAE
135	The initiative "Tribunal for Putin" lead by Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group and the Center for Civil Liberties is established to monitor war crimes and bring to justice the aggressors.	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.3. Social intervention	Human rights , protection, Sousveillance:	Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, etc	Nation-wide	24/03/2022	https://ccl.org.ua/en/claims/global-initiative-breaking-the-vicious-circle-of-russias-impunity-for-its-war-crimes-also-known-as-tribunal-for-putin/ , https://ccl.org.ua/en/claims/tribunal-for-putin-is-becoming-more-real/
136	The head of Kyrylivka Ivan Maleev refused to cooperate with the invaders from the so-called "military administration" of Melitopol	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	145. General administrative non-cooperation	Kyrylivka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	25/03/2022	https://www.061.ua/news/3358146/v-killilovku-zaehali-rossijskie-voennye-rf
137	Small gathering of protestors against the invasion in Novotroitske	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Novotroitske, Kherson oblast	South	25/03/2022	https://susilne.media/221436-ziteli-novotroicko-go-na-hersonsini-vijsli-na-mirnij-miting/

138	"Gunfire and the sounds of explosions were heard in the northern Ukrainian city of Slavutych after residents protested against Russian occupation."	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Slavutych	North	26/03/2022	https://www.rferl.org/a/smoke-and-gunfire-in-slavutych-as-city-protests-against-russian-occupation/31772069.html
139	Local residents concentrate in Melitopol's city center to demand the release of their mayor, Ivan Fedorov. The protest evolves in frictions with the Russian army	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Melitopol	South	14/03/2022	https://twitter.com/jimmysecuk/status/1503429415639953415?s=21 ; https://mobile.twitter.com/hwag_ucmc/status/1502583672834297863
140	Protests in Kherson. The Russian military began throwing tear gas grenades to disperse protesters. One protester was injured	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kherson	South	27/03/2022	https://t.me/jurnko/2637?single https://suspiine.media/222113-hersonci-znovu-vijsli-na-mirnij-miting-vijskovi-rf-rozignali-ludej-dimovimi-saskami/
141	Concentration to local residents to protest against the occupation in Kakhovka	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	27/03/2022	https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3441211-meskanci-kahovki-znovu-vijsli-na-mirnu-akciu-protestu-proti-rosijskoi-agresii.html
142	Local residents went on a peaceful protest in Enerhodar. They demanded that the Russian military leave the city, as well as the release of First Deputy Mayor Ivan Samoidyuk.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	28/03/2022	https://suspiine.media/222478-meskanci-energodara-vlastuvali-mirnij-miting-proti-okupacii-rosijskimi-vijskami/
143	In Berdyansk a local provider renounced its license in order not to cooperate with the Russian military occupying the city and not to spread propaganda, and also all employees resigned	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic non-cooperation	081. Trader's boycott	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	29/03/2022	https://espresso.tv/u-berdyansku-okupanti-pid-dulami-avtomativ-namagalisy-vklyuchiti-svoyu-propagandu-ale-provayder-vidmovivsyia-li-translyuvati-gerasimyuk
144	Protest in Hola Prystan. Protesters demand that the Russian army release the Mayor Alexander Babich and other abducted residents	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Hola Prystan, Kherson oblast	South	31/03/2022	https://suspiine.media/223525-u-golij-pristani-ludi-vijsli-na-miting-vimagaut-vid-vijskovih-rf-povernuti-miskogo-golovu/
145	Directors of secondary schools in Melitopol wrote applications for dismissal as a sign of unwillingness to cooperate with the occupiers	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	31/03/2022	https://suspiine.media/223842-direktori-skil-melitopola-napisali-zaavi-na-zvilnenna/
146	In Henichesk the flag of Ukraine was launched over the sea	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Henichesk	South	31/03/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/03/31/v-okupovanomu-genichesku-nad-morem-zapustili-prapor-ukra%D1%97ni-video/
147	Septic truck with the sticker of Putin face has appeared in the Brovary district	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Brovary, Kyiv Oblast	North	31/03/2022	https://t.me/truexanewsua/49053
148	As a sign of protest and unwillingness to cooperate with the Russian Federation, all school principals in Melitopol wrote applications for dismissal.	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	31/03/2022	https://t.me/svidomi_u/12297
149	Self-organised community in Podolianochka (Kyiv) design and build blockade infrastructure for the city	3. Nonviolent Intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	172. Nonviolent obstruction	Kyiv	North	01/04/2022	Interview with organisers from the Podolianochka community [field research mission]
150	New protest in Enerhodar, but Russian army shoot and injured four people	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Enerhodar	South	02/04/2022	https://www.ccma.cat/324/latac-de-russia-a-ucraina-en-directe/una-protesta-a-la-ciutat-ocupada-denerhodar-acaba-amb-4-ferits/minut/7110/263810/
151	Patriotic billboards "Kherson in our hearts" appeared on the streets of Kherson	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Kherson	South	02/04/2022	https://t.me/suspiinekherson/10183?single https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/04/02/xerson-u-nashix-sercyax-u-misti-vstanovili-desyatki-patriotichnix-bor-div-foto/
152	In the southern city of Nova Kakhovka, about 2,000 people showed their opposition to the invasion by waving Ukrainian flags and calling on Russian forces to leave	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Nova Kakhovka	South	03/04/2022	https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/6/7328860/ ; https://bykvu.com/eng/bukvy/hundreds-of-citizens-protest-against-russian-occupation-in-nova-kakhovka-kherson-region/ ; https://bykvu.com/eng/bukvy/several-people-wounded-as-russian-troops-stage-a-crack-down-on-a-protest-in-kakhovka/

153	Interception of communication of Russian army from Kharviv, Kyiv and Mariupol and publish in social media.	3. Nonviolent Intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	172. Nonviolent obstruction	Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mariupol	North/South	27/02/2022	https://www.ara.cat/internacional/foteu-camp-ucraine-sos-intercepten-radios-soldats-russos_1_4324074.html?utm_campaign=echobox&utm_medium=social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1648923469-2 ; https://twitter.com/xateond ;
154	Protest continue in Kherson in symbolic spaces. The number of people has decreased, but this protest had no organizers and took place in another location. Russian troops did not have time to disperse the protest.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	047. Assemblies of protest or support	Kherson	South	03/04/2022	https://twitter.com/tvtoront/status/1510571803147702276 https://t.me/vgo-runews/3645
155	Boycott action against multinational company Metro to stop their operations and investment in Russia due to their aggression to Ukraine	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic Non-cooperation	071. Consumer's boycott	Rivne	West	04/04/2022	Interview with Mykola davydiuk on May 2th 2022. Videos of actions: https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1xgGmyB4euX9p8bD7esznQNfzqD-nzGAE
156	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Henichesk	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Henichesk	South	08/06/2022 09/06/2022 19/06/2022 20/06/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/338 https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/334 https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/415 https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/411
157	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Kherson	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	12/06/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/364
158	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Nova Kakhovka	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Nova Kakhovka	South	12/06/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/357
159	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Oleshky	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Oleshky, Kherson oblast	South	27/04/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/27
160	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Novoaidar	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Novoaidar	East	16/05/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/172
161	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Donetsk	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Donetsk	East	29/05/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/267
162	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons and stickers were spotted in Luhansk	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Luhansk	East	01/06/2022 03/06/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/293 https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/298
163	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbon was spotted in Yalta	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Yalta	South	11/05/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/144
164	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Kerch	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kerch	South	19/05/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/197
165	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Simferopol	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Simferopol	South	18/05/2022 07/06/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/193 https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/326
166	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Alupka	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Alupka	South	07/06/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/330
167	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Prymorsk	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Prymorsk	South	04/06/2022	https://t.me/info_zp/9133
168	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Enerhodar	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Enerhodar	South	22/05/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/223

169	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Melitopol	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Melitopol	South	24/05/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/240
170	Initiative "Yellow Ribbon" launched a flash mob to hang yellow ribbons in public places in the occupied territories in support of Ukraine. Ribbons were spotted in Pryshyb	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Pryshyb	South	18/06/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/400
171	Local priests provide protection and evacuation of civilians from conflict-affected towns	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Donestk and Lugansk oblasts	East	05/04/2022	Interview with Archbishop Yevstraty (Zorya), spokesman of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in Kyiv
172	An action against the looting of the Russian military was staged near the Russian consulate in Lviv	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	029. Symbolic reclamation	Lviv	West	08/04/2022	https://t.me/svidomi_ua/13747
173	Local residents in Chernihiv oblast develop a communication system to find safe routes to move in the occupied region and access Chernihiv city, under siege, with food, medicines and other supplies	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.3. Social intervention	180. Alternative communication system	Chernihiv	North	09/04/2022	Interview to teacher in Chernihiv during field research visit on April
174	A mini-football tournament under the slogan "Hola Prystan' is Ukraine" was held in the occupied city of Hola Prystan in the Kherson region.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Hola Prystan, Kherson oblast	South	10/04/2022	https://twitter.com/GoncharenkoUa/status/1513183170455293954
175	In Kakhovka unknown people removed Russian flag from the House of Culture and burned it	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	11/04/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/04/11/na-xerson-shhini-vivisili-rosijskij-flag-zgodom-jogo-spalili/
176	Women groups leading the protection and evacuation in civilians between Kramatorsk and Izium	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Izium, Donestk oblast	East	11/04/2022	Interview with IWLPF in Kyiv
177	Zmina Human Rights organisation are providing support and counseling to activists to escape the occupied areas	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	171. Nonviolent interjection	Kherson, Melitopol, Zaporizhia	South	11/04/2022	Interview with Zmina HR organisations (online call)
178	Boycott action against multinational company Auchan to stop their operations and investment in Russia due to their aggression to Ukraine	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic Non-cooperation	071. Consumer's boycott	Kyiv	North	16/04/2022	Interview with Mykola davydiuk on May 2th 2022. Videos of actions: https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1xgGmyB4euX9p8bD7esznQnfzqD-nzGAE
179	In Velyki Kopani locals removed the Russian flag. After that the Russian military tightened restrictions on residents	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Velyki Kopani	South	18/04/2022	https://suspilne.media/230117-vijskovi-rf-posilili-obmezenna-v-gromadi-na-hersonsini-de-ziteli-znali-trikolor/
180	Video appeals of support to Kherson residents and residents of the region from famous people from show business, organised and published by Oleksiy Biletsky, have started appearing on Facebook	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	011. Records, radio, TV	Kherson	South	22/04/2022	https://suspilne.media/231568-hersonski-brati-organizuvali-akciu-pidtrimki-dla-ziteliv-mista-vid-zirok-soubizu/
181	Kherson mayor appealed to the President's Office with the assurance that he refused to cooperate with the Russian occupiers in Kherson	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	145. General administrative non-cooperation	Kherson	South	26/04/2022	https://suspilne.media/232839-hersonskij-miskij-golova-zvernuvsya-do-ofisu-prezidenta-z-privodu-nezakonnogo-priznacenna-kerivnikiv-kolaborantiv/
182	An art event "I Kherson oblast" was held in Lviv in support of the residents of the Kherson region. People held posters with the words "Kherson is Ukraine", "Oleshky" made graffiti and posted photos with protests	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Lviv	West	26/04/2022	https://suspilne.media/232872-u-lvovi-proveli-misteku-akciu-na-pidtrimku-ziteliv-hersonsini/
183	Boycott action against multinational company Pari-Match to stop their operations and investment in Russia due to their aggression to Ukraine	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic Non-cooperation	071. Consumer's boycott	Kyiv	North	26/04/2022	Interview with Mykola davydiuk on May 2th 2022. Videos of actions: https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1xgGmyB4euX9p8bD7esznQnfzqD-nzGAE
184	Volunteers from the Kherson Professional Shipbuilding Lyceum weld anti-tank hedgehogs	3. Nonviolent intervention	3.2. Physical intervention	172. Nonviolent obstruction	Kherson	South	27/02/2022	https://t.me/jurnko/1947
185	In Nova Kakhovka locals removed the red flag of the USSR from the cinema "Youth" and hung the Ukrainian flag	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Nova Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	27/04/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/04/27/u-novij-kaxovci-znyali-chervonij-prapor-z-kinoteatru-yunist/

186	Protest in Kherson against illegitimate referendum. Protesters were dispersed by Russian military almost immediately after the protest began. Four people were injured	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	029. Symbolic reclamation	Kherson	South	27/04/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/11100 https://t.me/suspilnekherson/11103
187	Rector of Kherson National Technical University Yuri Bardachov wrote a letter of resignation "of his own volition", because he was forced to stay in occupied Kherson and did not want to cooperate with the occupiers	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	121. Refusal of public support	Kherson	South	01/05/2022	https://www.facebook.com/729648217378908/posts/1645444299132624/
188	Chairman of the Novotroitske village council Petro Zbarovsky publicly refused to cooperate with representatives of the Russian Federation	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	145. General administrative non-cooperation	Novotroitske, Kherson oblast	South	03/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/11336
189	Boycott action against multinational company Raiser Bank to stop their operations and investment in Russia due to their aggression to Ukraine	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic Non-cooperation	071. Consumer's boycott	Kyiv	North	04/05/2022	Interview with Mykola davydiuk on May 2th 2022. Videos of actions: https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1xgGmyB4euX9p8bD7eszqNfzqD-nzGAE
190	According to the official city authorities of Berdyansk no head of a budgetary institution or utility company sided with the occupier	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic non-cooperation	078. Worker's boycott	Berdiansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	04/05/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/05/04/zhoden-pracivnik-byudzhetno%D1%97-sferi-berdianska-ne-pochav-spivpracyuvati-z-kolaborantami/
191	In Beryslav unknown removed Russian flag, which had previously hung the Russian military	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Beryslav, Kherson oblast	South	07/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/11474
192	Leaflets reading "Defeat Nazism - Defeat Racism" appeared on the streets of Tokmak	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	09/05/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/05/09/u-tokma-ku-miscevi-meshkanci-chinyat-sprotiv-rosiyanam/
193	In Chernihiv appeared graffiti "Kherson is Ukraine"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Chernihiv	North	11/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnechernihiv/8944
194	Postcards with an award for the head of local collaborator Kirill Stremousov have appeared in Kherson.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Kherson	South	11/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/11680
195	Graffiti showing that Kherson is Ukraine has appeared in the streets of the city	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Kherson	South	13/05/2022	https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/en/2022/05/13/resistance-in-kherson-ukrainian-graffiti-appeared-in-the-city/
196	In Kherson unknown people decorated the streets with patriotic postcards "Kherson is Ukraine"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Kherson	South	16/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/11921
197	In Kakhovka from the new school year, the so-called "government" plans to open 3 schools instead of 7. There is a lack of staff who agree to work under the leadership of the collaborators	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	078. Worker's boycott	Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	18/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/12003
198	In Kherson, unknown people set up a Ukrainian flag above the railway station	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	20/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/12096
199	Firefighters in Enerhodar protested against the abduction of fire and rescue chief Vitaliy Troyan. Russian military tried to disperse protesters beating people and damaging fire and rescue equipment	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	20/05/2022	https://suspilne.media/241403-v-energodari-spivrobitniki-dsns-vijsli-na-protest-proti-vikradenna-svo-go-oclnika/
200	In Beryslav, instead of the Ukrainian flag removed by the Russian military, locals painted the state flag of Ukraine on a pedestal under the flagpole	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Beryslav, Kherson oblast	South	21/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/12137
201	Residents of Kherson draw the state flag on poles, sports grounds, walls of houses, garages.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	24/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/12219
202	Teachers refused to attend one meeting organised by Russian occupiers to organise the educational system in Kherson oblast.	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Kherson	South	26/05/2022	https://khpg.org/en/1608810648

203	Blue and yellow ribbons are displayed in the city of Kherson	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	19/05/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/05/19/v-xersoni-zyavilas-ukra%D1%97nska-simvoli-ka-na-vulicyax-mista-foto/
204	Graffiti and blue-yellow ribbons are expanded in the city of Kherson	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	23/05/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/05/23/xerson-ci-malyuyut-ukra%D1%97nsku-simvoliku-po-vso-mu-mistu-video/
205	Graffiti representing the flag of Ukraine are displayed in buildings and streets in Kherson	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	28/05/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/05/28/xerson-znovu-pofarbuvali-u-sino-zhovti-kolori-foto/
206	Graffiti "Skadovsk is Ukraine!" appeared on the road in Skadovsk.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Skadovsk, Kherson oblast	South	26/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/12292
207	Graffiti "Kherson - Ukraine", "Kherson, Believe in the Armed Forces of Ukraine" appeared on the streets of Kherson	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Kherson	South	28/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/12364
208	In occupied Yalta a man sang an unknown song about love for Kyiv near a billboard with Putin	1. Protest and disuasion	1.6. Drama and music	036. Performance of plays and music	Yalta, Crimea	South	29/05/2022	https://crimea.suspilne.media/ua/news/7985
209	Strelkove residents refused to provide their data to local collaborators allegedly for an official census. One of the residents was beaten for refusing by Russian soldiers	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Strilkove, Kherson oblast	South	29/05/2022	https://suspilne.media/244544-na-hersonsini-u-strilkovomu-kolaborantam-ne-vdalos-provesti-perep-is-naseleenna-radnik-golovi-ova-hlan/
210	In the villages of Ozeriany, Sokolohirne, and Novohorivka all teachers refused to work under the Russian program.	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Ozeriany, Sokolohirne, Novohorivka, Kherson Oblast	South	29/05/2022	https://suspilne.media/244489-u-troh-selah-geniceskogo-rajonu-vsi-vciteli-vidmovilis-pracuvati-za-rosijskou-programou-sergij-danilov/
211	In Hola Prystan unknown people removed Russian flag from the flagpole and cut the lifting rope	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Hola Prystan, Kherson oblast	South	30/05/2022	https://t.me/suspilnekherson/12445
212	In Hola Prystan appeared graffiti "Putin freak"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Hola Prystan, Kherson oblast	South	31/05/2022	https://pivdenukraine.com.ua/2022/05/31/u-golijpristani-zyavivsyia-napis-zvernennya-do-rosiyan/
213	A banner "Crimea is Ukraine" has appeared on the website of the Russian authorities in the Nakhimovsky district of occupied Sevastopol	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Sevastopol, Crimea	South	31/05/2022	https://t.me/mash_na_volne/1393 https://t.me/suspilnecrimea/4006
214	In Kherson unknown people were able to damage Russian banners promoting propaganda about the region's history	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Kherson	South	02/06/2022	https://t.me/jurnko/3067
215	Russian troops wanted to take over the shopping centers of the "Epicenter" network in Kherson, the staff was held hostage for 3-4 hours, but nearly 80 percent of employees refused to cooperate with the occupiers	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic non-cooperation	078. Worker's boycott	Kherson	South	03/06/2022	https://suspilne.media/246425-prijsli-i-skazali-so-magazini-ihni-u-hersoni-rosijski-vijskovi-zahopili-epicentri/
216	In Kherson local entrepreneurs refuse to put double price tags in rubles and hryvnias on goods in their stores. Due to this, in Kherson appeared leaflets with warning that for violation of the order, the property of entrepreneurs will be destroyed or subordinated to the "authorities"	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	009. leaflets, pamphlets and book	Kherson	South	05/06/2022	https://suspilne.media/246839-tak-zvana-vlada-pogrozue-zabraty-abo-spalityi-majno-hersonskih-pidpriemciv/
217	Unknown people in Melitopol distributed leaflets calling to refuse Russian passports	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	008. Banner, posters and displayed communications	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	05/06/2022	https://ria-m.tv/news/288573/v_melitopole_partizanyi_ostavlyayut_poslaniya_okkupantam_i_gorodjanam_foto.html
218	Doctors refuse to cooperate with Russian occupiers in Kherson. Occupiers intend to transform public hospitals into military hospitals	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Kherson	South	06/06/2022	https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/3501085-in-kherson-medics-massively-refusing-to-cooperate-with-russian-invaders.html

219	In Zaporizhzhia region people refuse to cooperate with occupiers and accept humanitarian aid	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	zaporizhzhia	South	08/06/2022	https://sprotiv.mod.gov.ua/en/2022/06/08/in-occupied-territories-russians-are-unsuccessfully-trying-to-collect-personal-data-of-residents-for-referendum/
220	Teachers posted banners in Kherson city refusing to cooperate with Russian Occupiers	1. Protest and disuasion	1.4. Symbolic public act	018. Display of flags and symbolic colors	Kherson	South	09/06/2022	https://twitter.com/hliebushkina/status/1534979019246116866?t=1eWs1H7zleAM-v7WvSYq21g8s=19
221	In Luhansk region protest and non-cooperation by local residents are reducing the capacity of Russian occupation to mobilize people. Labour shortages have been reported in schools, business, etc.	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic non-cooperation	078. Worker's boycott	Lugansk	East	10/06/2022	https://sprotiv.mod.gov.ua/en/2022/06/10/in-the-luhansk-region-occupiers-reduced-the-mobilization-rate-because-of-local-protests/
222	In Kakhovka unknown people removed the largest Russian flag in the city from the flagpole	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	130. Removal of signs and placemarks	Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	South	12/06/2022	https://www.facebook.com/oleh.baturin/posts/pfbid-02Kr11ue492qyV532PBJE6RCWr51nX2WUMCKWV-9JiVzdZFBtFWmoaof4F5Qs33MNI
223	A representative of the so-called 'occupiers' administration" of the resort town of Kyrylivka demanded that local entrepreneurs pay tribute, but they refused	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic non-cooperation	081. Trader's boycott	Kyrylivka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	12/06/2022	https://www.061.ua/news/3405789/v-kirylivci-z-miscevih-pidpriemciv-vimagaut-platiti-daninu-novij-kerivnici-okupovanogo-selisa
224	In the occupied Crimea the owner of the service station refused to service the occupiers' military vehicle. The occupying authorities of Crimea ordered the demolition of the building	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic non-cooperation	078. Worker's boycott	Kurman Rayon, Crimea	South	13/06/2022	https://t.me/kazansky2017/3000 https://crimea.suspilne.media/ua/news/8150
225	The armed forces of the Russian Federation entered the main building of Kherson State University and appointed "leaders." KSU employees have left their jobs and will perform their duties remotely under Ukrainian law	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Kherson	South	14/06/2022	https://suspilne.media/250099-vijskovi-rf-zahopili-budivlu-hersonskogo-derzavnogo-universitetu-ta-priznaci-svoih-kerivnikov/
226	In Chaplynka the Russian military cannot find a sufficient number of "people's militiamen." Only four collaborators agreed to join the so-called "people's militia". Men who refuse to cooperate are forced to work on the equipment of their advanced positions	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	Refusal to join military service	Chaplynka, Kherson oblast	South	14/06/2022	https://suspilne.media/249922-u-caplinci-vijskovi-rf-ne-mozut-znaji-dostatnoi-kilkosti-narodnih-milicioneriv-centr-nacionalnogo-sprotivu/
227	Employees of the Tavriisk city council refused to cooperate with the "mayor" collaborator	2. Non-cooperation	2.3. Political non-cooperation	145. General administrative non-cooperation	Tavriisk, Kherson oblast	South	15/06/2022	https://suspilne.media/250557-na-hersonsini-vijskovi-rf-priznaci-tak-zvanim-merom-tavrijska-kahovskogo-advokata/
228	In occupied Alushta unknown people are distributing leaflets with the slogan "Crimea is Ukraine" and a quote from Zelensky	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	009. leaflets, pamphlets and book	Alushta, Crimea	South	16/06/2022	https://crimea.suspilne.media/ua/news/8126
229	In Crimea, leaflets have been distributed and displayed in cars reading "We will return Crimea and every piece of our land."	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	009. Leaflets, pamphlets and books	Crimea	South	17/06/2022	https://sprotiv.mod.gov.ua/en/2022/06/17/in-the-crimea-the-ukrainian-underground-distributed-leaflets-with-an-announcement-on-the-return-of-the-penisula/
230	"In Berdyansk, the occupiers are unable to open schools and kindergartens due to a lack of staff, as educational workers have refused to cooperate with them."	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	078. Worker's boycott	Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast	South	17/06/2022	https://sprotiv.mod.gov.ua/en/2022/06/17/in-berdyansk-educational-workers-en-masse-refuse-to-cooperate-with-the-occupiers/
231	Local residents in Chaplynka refuse to cooperate with Russian Occupiers in different type of tasks such as advanced engineering works	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic non-cooperation	078. Worker's boycott	Chaplynka, Kherson oblast	South	17/06/2022	https://sprotiv.mod.gov.ua/en/2022/06/17/russians-cannot-recruit-peoples-militia-in-the-occupied-territories/
232	Almost 36 000 users attended online demostartion in support of Kherson organized by "Yellow Ribbon" initiative. To do this, the meeting place was moved from a real street to a digital street on Instagram: meter by meter the central avenue of Kherson was painted - with all the houses, parks and intersections. Therefore, everyone could ask the organisers to mark themselves in the photo of the virtual street to take part in the demonstration	1. Protest and disuasion	1.9. Public assemblies	048. Protest meeting	Online	Nation-wide	18/06/2022	https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/404 https://www.instagram.com/kherson.is.ua/

233	In Beryslav the collective of pedagogical college refused the offer of the collaborator to work under the Russian educational programs	2. Non-cooperation	2.1. Social Non-cooperation	063. Social disobedience	Beryslav, Kherson oblast	South	18/06/2022	https://suspilne.media/251530-na-hersonsini-kol-ektiv-pedagogicnogo-koledzu-vidmovivsa-pracuvati-za-rosijskimi-programami/
234	Boycott action against multinational company Pari-Match to stop their operations and investment in Russia due to their aggression to Ukraine	2. Non-cooperation	2.2. Economic Non-cooperation	071. Consumer's boycott	Kyiv	North	20/06/2022	Interview with Mykola davydiuk on May 2th 2022. Videos of actions: https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1xgGmyB4euX9p8bD7esznQNfzqD-nzGAE
235	In occupied Simferopol unknown people posted leaflets with the inscription that the Crimean people are waiting for the liberation of the peninsula.	1. Protest and disuasion	1.2. Communications with a wider audience	009. leaflets, pamphlets and book	Simferopol, Crimea	South	21/06/2022	https://crimea.suspilne.media/ua/news/8170

